How Research Affects Policy: Experimental Evidence from 2,150 Brazilian Municipalities by Hjort, Jonas et al.
UC Berkeley
CEGA Working Papers
Title
How Research Affects Policy: Experimental Evidence from 2,150 Brazilian Municipalities
Permalink
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/22m501m4
Authors
Hjort, Jonas
Moreira, Diana
Rao, Gautam
et al.
Publication Date
2019-06-01
eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library
University of California
Working Paper Series
Center for Effective Global Action
University of California
Series Name: WPS 
Paper No.: 089
Issue Date: 8 July 2019 
How Research Affects Policy: 
Experimental Evidence from 2,150 
Brazilian Municipalities
Jonas Hjort, Diana Moreira, Gautam Rao, Juan Francisco Santini
This paper is posted at the eScholarship Repository, University of California. http://
escholarship.org/uc/cega_wps Copyright © 2019 by the author(s).
The CEGA Working Paper Series showcases ongoing and completed research by faculty 
affiliates of the Center. CEGA Working Papers employ rigorous evaluation techniques to 
measure the impact of large-scale social and eco-nomic development programs, and are 
intended to encourage discussion and feedback from the global development community.
Recommended Citation: 
Hjort, Jonas; Moreira, Diana; Rao, Gautam; Santini, J.F. (2019). How Research Affects 
Policy: Experimental Evidence from 2,150 Brazilian Municipalities. Working Paper Series 
No. WPS-089. Center for Effective Global Action. University of California, Berkeley.
HOW RESEARCH AFFECTS POLICY:
EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE FROM 2,150 BRAZILIAN MUNICIPALITIES
Jonas Hjort
Diana Moreira
Gautam Rao
Juan Francisco Santini
We thank the Lemann Brazil Research Fund at Harvard, the Weiss Family Fund, the Warburg 
Fund, and a JPAL Governance Initiative Pilot Grant for financial support; Teresita Cruz Vital, 
Xinyue Lin, Brian Wheaton and especially Deivis Angeli and Vinícius Schuabb for excellent 
research assistance; and Alberto Alesina, Juliano Assunção, Doug Bernheim, Stefano 
DellaVigna, Pascaline Dupas, Benjamin Enke, Bruno Ferman, Claudio Ferraz, Gustavo Gonzaga, 
Gianmarco León, Joana Naritomi, Muriel Niederle, Rohini Pande, Rudi Rocha, Chris Roth and 
seminar audiences at Columbia, the Escola de Economia de São Paulo, Harvard, PACDEV, PUC-
Rio, Stanford, U.C. Davis, and USC for helpful suggestions. This project underwent ethics review 
by the Committee on the Use of Human Subjects at Harvard University. The policy-adoption 
RCT reported in this paper is registered at the AEA’s Social Science Registry, number 
AEARCTR0004273. The initial draft of this paper was part of Juan Francisco Santini’s Ph.D. 
dissertation at PUC-Rio. Juan would like to thank all members of his dissertation committee for 
guidance and support throughout his Ph.D. The views expressed herein are those of the authors 
and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
© 2019 by Jonas Hjort, Diana Moreira, Gautam Rao, and Juan Francisco Santini. All rights 
reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit 
permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source.
How Research Affects Policy: Experimental Evidence from 2,150 Brazilian Municipalities 
Jonas Hjort, Diana Moreira, Gautam Rao, and Juan Francisco Santini
June 2019
JEL No. A11,D03,D04,D8,D9,H11,O2
ABSTRACT
This paper investigates if research findings change political leaders’ beliefs and cause policy 
change. Collaborating with the National Confederation of Municipalities in Brazil, we work with 
2,150 municipalities and the mayors who control their policies. We use experiments to measure 
mayors’ demand for research information and their response to learning research findings. In one 
experiment, we find that mayors and other municipal officials are willing to pay to learn the 
results of impact evaluations, and update their beliefs when informed of the findings. They value 
larger-sample studies more, while not distinguishing on average between studies conducted in 
rich and poor countries. In a second experiment, we find that informing mayors about research on 
a simple and effective policy (reminder letters for taxpayers) increases the probability that their 
municipality implements the policy by 10 percentage points. In sum, we provide direct evidence 
that providing research information to political leaders can lead to policy change. Information 
frictions may thus help explain failures to adopt effective policies.
Jonas Hjort
Graduate School of Business 
Columbia University
3022 Broadway, Uris Hall 622 
New York, NY 10027
and NBER
hjort@columbia.edu
Diana Moreira
University of California, Davis 
One shields avenue
1140 SSH building
Davis, CA 95616
dsmoreira@ucdavis.edu
Gautam Rao
Department of Economics 
Harvard University
Littauer M-30
Cambridge, MA 02138
and NBER
grao@fas.harvard.edu
Juan Francisco Santini 
Innovations for Poverty Action
Paseo De La Reforma 296
Col Juárez, 06600
Mexico City
Mexico
jsantini@poverty-action.org
A randomized controlled trials registry entry is available at 
https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/4273
1 Introduction
Recent decades have seen an explosion of program evaluation research in economics.1 But how
interested in and open to academic research are political leaders? And, insofar as they “consume”
research, can and do they act on new findings? These are questions of fundamental importance
for the science ecosystem. Despite the money and effort devoted to evaluating policy impact, we
have little understanding of whether the conditions necessary for the public to ultimately benefit
hold: whether political leaders value such research; whether it changes their beliefs about policy
effectiveness; and whether leaders ultimately implement policies that they otherwise would not
have in response to new research findings. In short, is a lack of (access to) research information a
binding constraint on policy choice?
In this paper, we provide experimental evidence on these questions. To do so, we leverage
an unusual collaboration with the National Confederation of Municipalities (Confederação Nacional
de Municípios, or CNM) in Brazil. We first report results from a demand/beliefs experiment mea-
suring policy-makers’ willingness-to-pay (hereafter WTP) to learn the findings of rigorous impact
evaluation research, as well as how such findings affect their beliefs. 900 municipal officials (pri-
marily mayors) from 657 municipalities participated in this first experiment. To estimate the ulti-
mate impact on actual policy adoption, we use a second, larger-scale policy-adoption field experi-
ment with 1,818 Brazilian mayors. A randomly-selected treatment group of mayors was invited to
attend a research information session at a large CNM convention. A presenter informed the audi-
ence about the findings of a set of RCTs showing positive effects on tax compliance of a taxpayer
reminder letter policy. We then measured policy adoption at the municipality level 15 to 24 months
later. In combination, the demand/beliefs and policy-adoption experiments allow us to estimate
both the extent to which research findings influence policy if directly provided to political leaders,
and the interest and belief-updating that mediates such influence.
Brazil’s municipalities are an excellent setting to investigate how research affects policy practice
for three reasons. First, their political leaders hold a role analogous to that of many countries’
head of state: Brazilian mayors are directly elected and individually wield considerable de jure
power over policy choices within the areas municipalities control, and over 90 percent also raise
tax revenues locally.2 Second, there are 5,570 municipalities in Brazil, and our collaboration with
CNM gives us direct access to their leadership. This enabled us to carry out experiments at the
polity level. Finally, local governments and governments in developing countries may lack the
resources or technical capacity to acquire relevant research information.
Demand/beliefs experiment. Our first experiment finds that the political leaders of Brazil’s mu-
nicipalities exhibit significant demand for research and change their beliefs in response to research
findings. The policy context for the experiment is Early Childhood Development (ECD) programs,
1For example, more than 2,500 studies have been registered with the American Economic Association’s registry for
randomized controlled trials (RCTs) since its launch in May 2013.
2In Brazil, municipalities control policy areas such as pre-school and primary education, and preventative health and
sanitation. Over 90 percent of Brazilian municipalities raise tax revenues locally—primarily from property and service
taxes—in addition to the federal and state transfers they receive.
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whose impacts on children’s test scores have been estimated in existing, rigorous research. We
make use of four otherwise comparable RCTs conducted in different locations and with different
sample sizes.3 Our experiment begins by eliciting beliefs about the likely impact of an ECD pol-
icy if implemented in the participant’s own municipality. We then present the participant with
one randomly-selected study, mentioning two study characteristics (location and sample size).
We elicit the participant’s WTP to learn the study’s results using an incentive-compatible proce-
dure, and then randomize whether the individual actually receives the result (conditional on their
WTP).4 If the results of the study are revealed, we elicit the participant’s posterior beliefs about the
likely effect of the policy. We also elicit incentivized beliefs about the likely effect in the contexts
where the policy was actually implemented and evaluated. Finally, we offer the participant the
opportunity to pay for practical advice on how to implement the ECD program.
We find that, while participants hold widely varying beliefs about the impact of the ECD policy
to begin with, they are willing to pay an arguably fairly high amount to find out the results of
an impact evaluation: about USD 36 on average (under certain assumptions to benchmark the
experimental currency). The average WTP is higher for studies with a large sample size, and
among officials from municipalities that had already implemented a similar program, but not for
studies conducted in a location that is closer to Brazil’s income level. Learning the results of an
RCT causes officials to update their beliefs about impact: their posterior is a weighted average
of their prior and the revealed study’s findings. Consistent with the demand (WTP) findings,
policy-makers update their beliefs more when they receive large sample studies, but not when
they receive studies conducted in developing countries rather than the U.S. While we cannot rule
out that these differential responses to different studies are in part driven by attributes participants
expect to correlate with sample size and the economic development of the study location—the two
study characteristics we explicitly state—60 percent of the participants who report preferring the
large sample studies in a debriefing survey mention statistical precision as a reason.
While our experiment is not designed to test a complete model of rational learning—we do
not know how much participants should pay for, or should update their beliefs in response to,
research—we find little evidence for certain deviations from Bayesian learning. Specifically, par-
ticipants on average do not display confirmation bias—they do not interpret information in a way
that tends to reinforce their prior—nor do they respond asymmetrically to good versus bad news
regarding the policy (relative to their prior). We also do not find evidence for politically-motivated
updating. Randomly informing participants (truthfully) that recent leftist governments in Brazil
strongly supported the use of ECD policies had no statistically significant effect on their priors,
WTP or belief-updating, on average or differentially by partisan affiliation.
Altogether, the findings of our first experiment suggest that political leaders are fairly sophis-
3The studies we use are Grantham-McGregor et al. (1991); Walker et al. (2005); Puma et al. (2010); Barnett (2011);
Attanasio et al. (2014). These are all high-quality studies of the impact of ECD in respectively Jamaica (first two studies),
the U.S. as a whole, Michigan, and Colombia, with varying sample sizes.
4WTP is elicited in terms of an experimental currency. Specifically, each participant is endowed with lottery tickets
with a chance to win an expenses-paid trip to the United States. They may instead use some of these lottery tickets to
purchase access to the findings of the research.
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ticated consumers of research information, at least once such information is made (easily) accessi-
ble. In line with this interpretation, we find that a higher posterior causally increases the policy-
maker’s WTP for practical information on how to implement the policy.
Policy-Adoption Experiment. Our second experiment shows that supplying mayors with research
findings affects the actual policies adopted by their municipalities. In this experiment, we as-
signed a randomly chosen subset of the mayors attending CNM’s 2016 Novos Gestores convention
in Brasília—the heads of the governments of 1,818 Brazilian municipalities—to a treatment group
which was invited to attend an optional research information session.5 The policy tool discussed
in the session was reminder letters to taxpayers to induce them to comply with taxes. We chose
this policy both because its impact is well-documented in existing, rigorous research, and because
it is inexpensive and easy to implement. During the 45-minutes long information session, an ex-
perienced presenter introduced the idea of impact evaluation, described taxpayer reminder letters
and their content, and presented research findings from studies on the quantitative impact of such
letters on tax compliance.6 At the end of the session, mayors were provided with a printed policy
brief summarizing the information.
We find that attending the research information session increased the probability that munic-
ipalities had implemented taxpayer reminders 15-24 months later by a remarkable 10 percentage
points, or 33 percent relative to the 32 percent of municipalities in the control group which already
implemented the policy.7 There is little evidence of heterogeneity in treatment effects by leader
or municipality characteristics; for example, term-limited mayors appear to be equally likely to
respond as mayors that face re-election incentives.
In combination, the findings from our demand/beliefs and policy-adoption experiments make
clear that political leaders are interested in; update their beliefs in response to; and ultimately
act on new research findings. Of course, caveats and open questions remain. Our policy-adoption
experiment studies a low-cost and easy-to-implement policy: information might not be the binding
constraint to more expensive or technically demanding (but effective) policies being implemented.
We also do not capture the numerous less-direct channels through which research may influence
policy. Finally, if policy-makers do value research information and react to it, as we argue, this
raises an important question: what prevents them from acquiring such information in the status
quo? We hope that future work will shed light on these questions.
This paper contributes to and bridges the literatures on state effectiveness on the one hand, and
5The sampling frame consists of Brazilian municipalities with populations between 5,000 and 100,000 inhabitants
for which the mayor was confirmed to attend the Novos Gestores convention. 45 percent of all mayoral administra-
tions in Brazil within the relevant population range went to Brasília and thus were part of our sample. There are 881
municipalities in the treatment group and 937 municipalities in the control group.
6The findings that were presented at the information session were based on the following studies Coleman (1996);
Hasseldine et al. (2007); Del Carpio (2013); Fellner et al. (2013); Castro & Scartascini (2015); Hallsworth et al. (2017).
7We surveyed key bureaucrats in treatment and control municipalities with knowledge of the municipality’s tax
policies (typically in the finance department) from February to November 2018—15-24 months after the Novos Gestores
convention—to verify whether taxpayer reminder letters were being implemented in the municipality. We additionally
called mayors and tax bureaucrats to measure both beliefs about policy impacts and policy adoption. In 81 percent of
the municipalities in the sample, at least one person was surveyed. There was no differential attrition between treatment
and control municipalities.
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the role of evidence and experts’ beliefs on the other. The former has focused on selection into the
state enterprise, and variation in politicians’ and public sector workers’ effectiveness under differ-
ent incentive schemes.8 Using a polity-level field experiment somewhat parallel to the manage-
ment interventions in private firms first studied in Bloom et al. (2013), we instead show that infor-
mation frictions at the top—heads of government’s lack of knowledge of policies’ effectiveness—
directly constrains policy decisions.9 Our findings make clear that it is not the case, for example,
that counterfactual policies’ effectiveness is widely known “on the ground”, nor that political lead-
ers are uninterested in, unconvinced by, or unable to act on new research information. This implies
that policy research can help political leaders improve their constituents’ lives.
By starting to unpack how political leaders’ beliefs are shaped—and their consequences—we
also advance an emerging body of evidence on belief formation and the role of evidence. While
most such research studies beliefs in lay populations to identify systematic biases and heuristics
(see Benjamin (2018) for a review), we add to the smaller body of work studying the beliefs of
experts such as central bankers (Malmendier et al., 2017), academics (DellaVigna & Pope, 2018),
and judges (Chen et al., 2016).10 In this sense, our study is most closely related to Banuri et al. (2017),
Nellis et al. (2019), and Vivalt & Coville (2019), who study how the beliefs of policy professionals—
program officers, aid-agency workers, and government officials—respond to research findings and
new data. Complementing their work, we study the extent to which academic research changes
elected heads of government’s beliefs; the extent to which they themselves value access to research,
and how policy adoption ultimately responds to research findings.11 It also complements recent
research showing that citizens do change their policy preferences in response to evidence, even on
controversial topics such as immigration (Grigorieff et al., 2016; Haaland & Roth, 2019).
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides institutional information about
Brazilian local governments and our partner organization. Section 3 presents the design and re-
sults from the demand/beliefs experiment. Section 4 discusses our second intervention, the policy-
adoption experiment, and finally we conclude in Section 5.
8The literature on state effectiveness often views states as organizations and has focused on front-line public sector
workers (see Finan et al. (2017) for a review), bureaucrats (see e.g. Duflo et al. (2013); Nath (2015); Khan et al. (2016,
2019); Akhtari et al. (2018); Bertrand et al. (forthcoming); Best et al. (2018); Duflo et al. (2018); Rasul & Rogger (2018),
among others), and leaders’ identities (Chattopadhyay & Duflo, 2004; Jones & Olken, 2005; Besley et al., 2011; Beaman
et al., 2012; Martinez-Bravo, 2014; Yao & Zhang, 2015; Easterly & Pennings, 2017; Martinez-Bravo, 2017; Bertrand et al.,
forthcoming; Xu, 2018). For an overview of the literature on politican motives, see Persson & Tabellini (2002).
9In this sense the existing study closest to ours is Hoffmann et al. (2017). They carry out an innovative lab-in-the-field
incentive-compatible choice experiment in which elected county councilors in Kenya chose among alternative water
infrastructure projects. Other influential polity-level natural and field experiments such as Fujiwara & Wantchekon
(2013) and Bidwell et al. (2019)—and related studies in political science—have randomized how electoral campaigns
take place across electoral districts or villages and studied the impact on electoral outcomes.
10Our policy-adoption experiment builds on the influential information-provision approach pioneered by Jensen
(2010) and many related studies (see, among others, Kling et al. (2012); Chetty & Saez (2013); Dizon-Ross (2018)).
11Banuri et al. (2017), Nellis et al. (2019), and Vivalt & Coville (2019) study the belief-formation of (mostly U.K. and
U.S.-based) policy professionals. Like Nellis et al. (2019), we find evidence of fairly sophisticated processing of informa-
tion, with little evidence of obvious deviations from Bayesian learning. Unlike Vivalt & Coville (2019), we do not find
evidence of precision-neglect or of asymmetric responses to positive and negative news, and unlike Banuri et al. (2017),
we do not find evidence of ideologically-driven confirmation bias. Another related paper is Beynon et al. (2012), who
use an online experiment to study the optimal design of policy briefs.
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2 Institutional Background and Context
This section provides relevant background information on municipal governments in Brazil, our
partner organization, and the conferences where our experiments began.
2.1 Brazilian municipalities
Municipalities are the lowest level of government in Brazil. In total, there are 5,570 municipalities
distributed across 26 states. Municipal governments are headed by elected mayors, who appoint
secretaries to lead the municipal bureaucracy. Once elected, mayors serve a four-year term and
can hold office up to two consecutive terms. Elections are generally considered fair, such that
politicians face some electoral accountability. In addition to the executive branch, Brazilian munic-
ipalities have a legislative branch, which reviews and approves the annual budget, participates in
the elaboration of local laws, and oversees the mayor’s administration.
In Brazil, as in many Latin American countries, provision of services is generally devolved to
municipalities, while revenue generation and collection is partially devolved. Municipal govern-
ments are responsible for key public services such as education, health, sanitation, and transporta-
tion. To cover the costs, municipalities rely in part on intergovernmental transfers. On average, 60
percent of municipalities’ total revenues are transfers from state governments and the federal gov-
ernment. Part of the remainder is locally raised by municipalities themselves. Municipal govern-
ments are responsible for collecting local taxes, which represent on average 15 percent of municipal
revenues.
In general, municipal governments are highly autonomous. The mayor negotiates the budget
allocation with the city councilors and has full autonomy over its execution. The mayor’s office
thus holds policy-making authority over a wide range of areas. Our research information experi-
ments will involve two such areas: early-childhood education and locally raised taxes. We describe
these two areas in more detail in sections 3 and 4.
2.2 Our partner organization
This study leveraged a unique opportunity to conduct a series of large-scale experiments with
thousands of local political leaders through a partnership with Brazil’s National Confederation
of Municipalities (CNM). CNM is a non-partisan organization that serves as a coordinating body
and advocate of Brazilian municipalities’ interests at the state and federal level. Over 80 percent of
all Brazilian municipalities are members of CNM. Importantly for our purposes, CNM organizes
a variety of conferences and conventions throughout the year, in which thousands of municipal
officials from all over the country participate.
These meetings provide an unusual opportunity to reach a large population of political leaders
in one place. Meeting attendees comprise mayors, vice-mayors, local legislators, and municipal
secretaries. Our demand/beliefs experiment was conducted at two of CNM’s annual national con-
ventions (May 2017 and May 2018) and at 12 regional conferences held in different states (August-
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December 2017).12 Our policy-adoption experiment was conducted at CNM’s biggest national
conference—called Novos Gestores—which is held every four years in Brasília (October-November
2016). All mayors who were (re-)elected in the last municipal election are invited to attend Novos
Gestores.
Our research-information interventions were one of the many activities that took place at these
meetings. The meetings are each approximately three days long, and are structured around differ-
ent training sessions and presentations by various political actors, including regional actors such
as the regional associations of municipalities, and public and private municipal suppliers, as well
as national ones such as CNM itself, federal government officials, congress representatives, and
often the Brazilian President. In addition to attending the presentations, local policy-makers use
the meetings to organize get-togethers with each other and with state and federal officials. Each
national conference brings around 4,000 municipal representatives and 2,000 mayors, while the
regional conferences attract around 200 local political leaders, of which approximately 50 are may-
ors. Thus, our experiments take place in a quite natural setting, where policy-makers are used to
receiving useful information.
2.3 Identifying target policies
All information we provided to policy-makers in the experiments satisfied two main conditions.
First, the policies we focused on were directly within the control, familiarity, and broadly stated in-
terest of municipal officials. Second, the information we provided was based on rigorous research,
with emphasis on studies that evaluated interventions in Latin American countries.
To identify policy areas of interest to local policy-makers, we conducted comprehensive sur-
veys and focus groups with 60 mayors in May 2016. Substantial interest in acquiring research
information was reported by mayors, especially on pre-school education, preventive health care,
and management practices. Mayors were also concerned with budgetary issues, especially consid-
ering the fiscal crisis affecting state and local governments in Brazil at the time (Mulas-Granados,
2017). Based on mayors’ priorities, we searched for, and systematically reviewed, research studies
on Google Scholar, and the websites of J-PAL, IPA, 3ie, World Bank, IADB, and leading policy and
research institutions in Brazil such as the repository of papers on IPEA, C-Micro-FGV, and on the
websites of leading Brazilian scholars. We identified a number of promising options, and after
coordinating with CNM, we decided to build the experimental interventions based on research in-
formation on early childhood development programs and on tax reminder letters. These policies
were appealing for our purposes because they were evaluated in existing, rigorous research, and
the taxpayer reminder letter policy we focus on in the policy-adoption experiment is inexpensive
and relatively easy to implement. In addition, the set of studies evaluating the impact of each of
the two policies varied in their attributes, allowing us to investigate how study features such as
sample size and location affect policy-makers’ responses.
12The 12 regional conferences were held in the following states: Alagoas, Bahia, Ceará, Espírito Santo, Maranhão,
Mato Grosso do Sul, Minas Gerais, Paraná, Piauí, Rio Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina and São Paulo.
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3 Demand/Beliefs Experiment
In this section, we describe an experiment to measure (a) whether Brazilian policy-makers exhibit
demand for research information, and (b) how receiving such information affects their beliefs. The
policy area this experiment focused on was Early Childhood Development (ECD) programs, a
well-studied topic in social science. We find that policy-makers value research on the effect of ECD
programs, and update their beliefs in a fairly sophisticated way in response.
3.1 Experimental setting and sample
We implemented the demand/beliefs experiment with 900 officials from 657 municipalities at 14
CNM meetings across Brazil in 2017 and 2018.13 The conferences were attended by mayors, vice-
mayors, municipal secretaries, and local legislators. We designed a half-hour long experiment that
was self-administered by participants using tablets. Research assistants recruited conference par-
ticipants during breaks in between sessions. Participation was voluntary but incentivized as de-
scribed in the next section. One of the researchers and one research assistant were present through-
out to monitor and answer questions.
Almost 49 percent of participants in the experiment were mayors; 28 percent were local legis-
lators; 16 percent were municipal secretaries; and 7 percent were vice-mayors.14 The geographical
distribution of the municipalities represented is shown in Figure 2, and Table 1 displays summary
characteristics. About 37 percent of represented municipalities have mayors affiliated to a leftist
political party, and approximately 20 (78) percent of children aged 0 to 3 (4 to 5) years old in these
municipalities attend a pre-school educational establishment. 42 percent of participants report that
their municipalities have implemented ECD programs.
3.2 Experimental design
The structure of the experiment, depicted graphically in Figure 1, was as follows. We began by
introducing the ECD policy. Then we elicited participants’ prior beliefs about the effectiveness of
the policy, and their willingness-to-pay (hereafter WTP) to learn the findings from related impact
evaluation research. Next, we revealed the findings, and finally, we elicited participants’ posteriors
to assess the extent to which the research findings affected their beliefs. The Appendix provides
the key parts of the experimental script. Below, we describe the experiment in greater detail.
Introductory Stage. We began with a short survey eliciting demographic and professional infor-
mation. Next, we described ECD programs, highlighting the key outcomes on which such pro-
grams are evaluated (test scores, cognitive skills) and how those outcomes are reported (standard-
ized effect sizes). To ease understanding of the policy and its objectives, we provided illustrative
13The meetings comprised two national conferences held in Brasília (May 2017 and 2018), and twelve regional Diálogo
Municipalista conferences organized from August to December 2017 in the states of Alagoas, Bahia, Ceará, Espírito
Santo, Maranhão, Mato Grosso do Sul, Minas Gerais, Paraná, Piauí, Rio Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina and São Paulo.
14We were able to complete the experiment with 38.8 percent of attending mayors, 48.5 percent of vice-mayors, 35.4
percent of municipal secretaries, and 40.9 percent of local legislators.
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FIGURE 1: DEMAND/BELIEFS EXPERIMENT:
STRUCTURE
examples of current similar programs in Brazil and presented participants with a few benchmarks
for effect sizes, such as the gains in standardized test scores associated with an additional year of
high school in Brazil (0.2 sd).
Eliciting priors. We began the main part of the experiment by eliciting the participant’s prior
beliefs. Specifically, we asked what they believed the impact of the policy on cognitive skills was
likely to be if it were to be implemented in his/her own municipality.15 Immediately after, we
asked a similar question about the expected impact in two other locations. These two other loca-
tions were randomly chosen out of four locations where academics have estimated the impact of
ECD programs using RCTs. These studies vary in location and sample size. They evaluate com-
parable ECD programs in Colombia (n=1420) (Attanasio et al., 2014), Jamaica (n=130) (Grantham-
McGregor et al., 1991; Walker et al., 2005), Michigan (n=123) (Barnett, 2011), and across multiple
15For simplicity and due to limited time with each participant, we elicited only point predictions (about effects on
cognitive skills), rather than full probabilistic beliefs.
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states in the U.S. (n=4667) (Puma et al., 2010). When the relevant studies were presented to the
participant, we highlighted both the study location and sample size.
Attributes Small Sample Large Sample
Developing Country Jamaica, n = 130 Colombia, n = 1420
Rich Country Michigan, n = 123 USA, n = 4667
While we cannot incentivize accurate beliefs about the impact in the participant’s own mu-
nicipality (since we do not observe the true effect), we randomize incentives to accurately predict
the effect in the other two locations (where we can compare the participant’s prediction to the es-
timates from the research). In practice, we found that the size of the incentives has no effect on
priors, WTP, or posteriors, suggesting that participants took the questions seriously even in the
absence of incentives, and that making better predictions for the sake of higher payoff within the
experiment is not an important driver of this paper’s results.
WTP and Belief Updating: Round 1. After the participants reported their priors, we offered them
the chance to purchase the findings (i.e. learn the estimated effect size) from one randomly-chosen
study. The experimental currency in which we elicited WTP consisted of lottery tickets, which
also incentivized participation. We initially endowed each participant with 100 such lottery tick-
ets, each with a chance of winning a free trip to visit the United States (typically a visit to Boston,
including a tour of the Harvard University campus). Participants could save their lottery tickets
for the lucky draw or use some, or all of them, to learn the estimated effect size of the study. Fol-
lowing a Becker-DeGroot-Marschak elicitation procedure (BDM), we measured the participant’s
maximum WTP [0 to 100] to find out the results of the relevant study. We then drew a randomized
price for the study. If the price was below the participant’s WTP, we revealed the findings and
deducted the price from the participant’s stock of lottery tickets.
To ensure that we observed belief updating for most participants, while maintaining incentive-
compatibility in the BDM procedure, the price was drawn from a distribution with high mass
at zero. Consequently, 80-90 percent (depending on the conference) of participants received the
information regardless of their WTP. We emphasize this sample for the belief-updating analysis,
since these participants receive the information without selection. For those who received the
information, we subsequently elicited posterior beliefs about the expected impact of the policy in
their own municipality, and in the study location that was not offered for purchase in this round.
WTP and Belief Updating: Round 2. In the next stage, we presented the participant with a menu
of the three studies that were not offered for purchase in Round 1, again highlighting each study’s
location and sample size. The participant received a fresh budget of 100 lottery tickets and was
told that one of the three studies would be randomly offered for purchase. They were asked to
report their WTP for each study, to be implemented if that study was randomly chosen for sale. We
thus obtained incentive-compatible WTPs for each of the three studies. We revealed the findings of
one study following the same procedure as before, and again elicited an updated posterior belief.
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FIGURE 2: DEMAND/BELIEFS EXPERIMENT:
SAMPLE MUNICIPALITIES
3.3 Results
We interpret the results from our experiment through the lens of a standard Bayesian-learning
framework. Suppose that policy-maker i has a prior belief Spri ∼ N (µpri , Σpri ), where µpri is the
mean of i’s prior and Σpri is the perceived variance or uncertainty of their prior about the likely
effect of the ECD policy if implemented in their municipality. The effect size from the research
study can be thought of as a noisy signal SIi,c ∼ N (µI , ΣIi,c), drawn from a distribution centered
around the true value µI , but with variance ΣIi,c, where c indexes characteristics of the study, such
as its sample size or location. Then, a Bayesian policy-maker who wants to have accurate beliefs
(to minimize mean squared error) will form a posterior Spoi :
Spoi = (1− pi)Spri + piSIi,c
with the weights pi = Σ
pr
i
Σpri +Σ
I
i,c
. That is, a Bayesian learner’s posterior will be a convex combination
of their prior and the “signal” (i.e. the effect-size from the study), with weights proportional to the
perceived relative precision of each component.
We can think of the key attributes of the study—location and sample size—as affecting the
perceived precision or informativeness of the noisy signal. If participants think that larger-sample
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studies are more informative (ΣIi,large < Σ
I
i,small), they will place greater weight on the effect size
of larger-sample studies while forming their posterior beliefs. Importantly, if policy-makers value
having accurate beliefs about the effectiveness of ECD policies, their WTP for signals will be higher
for the signals which they will ex-post weight more strongly in their belief updating.
Priors about effect size. We start by analyzing policy-makers’ priors about the effectiveness of
ECD policies. The average policy-maker prior appears sensible. Appendix Table A.1 shows that
the average policy-maker believes that ECD policies are more effective in rich countries (effect size
of 0.46-0.49 sd) than in developing countries (effect size of 0.38-0.41 sd). On average, municipal
officials believe the effect size in their own municipality (0.4 standard deviations) is very close to
the average prior for the developing countries. However, this masks substantial heterogeneity in
priors: the standard deviation of priors is 0.22, implying substantial disagreement across policy-
makers.16
Willingness-to-pay for estimated effect size. After policy-makers reported their priors, we elicited
their WTP to learn the research finding of one of the four (randomly assigned) studies. According
to the Bayesian framework, WTP should be larger the more informative the signal is perceived to
be. We estimate the following equation:
WTPijs = β0 + β1Developingijs + β2Largeijs + εijs (1)
where WTPijs is the WTP (in terms of lottery tickets) for the research finding of policy-maker
i in round j ∈ 1, 2 for study s ∈ Michigan, USA, Jamaica, Colombia. Developings equals one
for studies in Jamaica or Colombia and 0 otherwise. Larges equals one for the two large-sample
studies (Colombia with n=1420 and USA with n=4667) and 0 otherwise (Jamaica with n=130 and
Michigan with n=123). Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.
Table 2 presents the OLS results from specification (1). Column 1 pools the two rounds, while
columns 2 and 3 present estimates separately for round 1 and round 2 respectively. We find that
policy-makers allocate on average 45 lottery tickets (out of the 100 tickets they are endowed with
each round) to learn about the effect size of a particular study. While this is a large share of their
experimental endowment, it is difficult to interpret the level directly since the currency is lottery
tickets, whose subjective value is unobserved. To benchmark the WTP, we calculated a money
metric for the experimental currency by offering gift cards from a major retail and online chain
(Lojas Americanas, similar to Walmart) for purchase using a similar BDM procedure to a sub-sample
of participants. We found that an additional lottery ticket was exchanged for approximately 0.80
USD worth of gift cards. This benchmarking must be interpreted with caution, but suggests that
the baseline WTP for the research finding of 45 lottery tickets was equivalent to 36 USD. There is
substantial heterogeneity in demand: the standard deviation of WTP is 32 lottery tickets. Yet, 98
percent of participants have strictly positive WTP.17
16Of course, some of this variance in priors may reflect noise in the belief-elicitation process.
17Readers might wonder why participants would not simply look up the research themselves. While this may hap-
pen to some extent, we believe that unfamiliarity with research-information sources, language barriers, and difficulty
interpreting academic writing are all factors that make this strategy difficult for our study participants. Our estimates
may be thought of as capturing their WTP for simplified, conveniently-presented, bottom-line information.
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We next analyze whether demand for research findings varies with the attributes of the re-
search. We find that political leaders are willing to pay about 8 percent more for large-sample size
studies than for smaller-sample studies. Thus, policy-makers appear to ex-ante value the statistical
precision of a study. This relationship is stronger in the second round, when studies are offered
side-by-side, but the second-round estimate is not statistically different from the first-round esti-
mate (p-value 0.496). In contrast, and contrary to our priors, we do not find significant differences
between the WTP for research findings from developing versus developed countries. This sug-
gests that Brazilian policy-makers do not consider studies from other developing countries to be
more informative—more externally valid for them—than rich-country studies.
We report participant and municipality-level correlates of WTP in Appendix Table A.2. Only
three characteristics out of nineteen are significantly associated with WTP: whether the partici-
pant is male, whether their municipality has previously implemented an ECD policy, and whether
they reported having previously heard about such policies despite not having implemented them.
Through the lens of the framework, the latter correlations are not obvious: policy-makers with
more past experience with a policy might already perceive that they have a precise prior, and
therefore not value more information. Instead, we find that it is precisely the policy-makers who
implement and spend municipal resources on ECD programs who have the highest WTP for re-
lated research information.
Belief Updating. Having established that political leaders value research findings, and pay more
for larger-sample studies, we turn to whether and how they actually update their beliefs upon
learning research findings. Note that if policy-makers purchase information purely to use it to per-
suade others, for instance, they might not update their own beliefs upon receiving the information.
Following the Bayesian framework, we estimate the following equation:
Posteriorijs = β1Priorij + β2Signalijs + εij (2)
where Posteriorijs is policy-maker i’s updated belief about the likely effect in their own munic-
ipality after learning the effect size from study Signalijs of study s in round j. Posteriors after
round 1 serve as priors for round 2, and standard errors are clustered at the individual level.
Table 3 presents the OLS estimates of specification (2). Column 1 pools the two rounds, while
columns 2 and 3 present estimates separately for round 1 and round 2 respectively. Consistent
with the Bayesian framework, βˆ1 and βˆ2 are both positive and statistically significant, and sum up
to approximately 1. Participants place substantial weight on both their prior and the study finding,
and do not simply accept or repeat back the research finding. This finding reduces concerns about
experimenter demand effects. They place slightly greater weight on their prior when forming
beliefs about their own municipality, compared to beliefs about an alternative location (Column 4
vs. Column 2). They also place more weight on their prior in the second round, when it already
incorporates the finding of the first study they received. As described previously, by design, 80-90
percent of participants are assigned a zero price and receive the research information regardless of
their WTP. Column 5 restricts attention to these observations, and finds very similar results as in
the full sample.
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In order to test whether participants update more based on large-sample or developing-country
studies, we estimate:
Posteriorijs = β1Priorij + β2Signalij
+ β3Developingijs × Priorij + β4Developingijs × Signalij
+ β5Largeijs × Priorij + β6Largeijs × Signalij + εij (3)
where Largeijs and Developingijs are defined as in equation (1). Under the framework, if an
individual perceives a study to be more informative, they will place more weight on the signal from
that study and correspondingly less weight on their prior. Therefore, to test whether participants
perceive (say) large-sample studies to be more informative, we can test whether β5 < 0 and β6 > 0,
or instead (a weaker test) whether β6 − β5 > 0.
Table 4 presents the OLS results of specification (3). Again, Column 1 pools the two rounds,
while columns 2 and 3 present estimates separately for each round. We find consistent evidence
that participants place greater weight on signals from large-sample studies, but not on signals from
developing-country studies.18 This lines up with the findings on WTP, and confirms that these
policy-makers find larger-sample studies to be more informative, but do not consider studies from
developing and rich countries to be differentially informative. The greater weight placed on large-
sample studies is evident also in round 1, when one study is presented in isolation. The pattern
of results holds up, and indeed is slightly strengthened, when we restrict attention to cases where
the price drawn was zero in Column 5.
Caveats, Confounds and Qualifications. While we interpret the differences in WTP and belief-
updating across sample size and study location as the direct effect of these two characteristics,
both could be correlated in policy-makers’ minds with omitted variables such as the quality of the
research, the scale of implementation of the program, etc. To shed light on this, we conducted a
debriefing survey with a subset of the sample (n=296). We find that 60 percent of policy-makers
who preferred large-sample studies chose statistical precision as the reason. Intriguingly, a smaller
share also reported preferring larger-sample studies because they are more likely to have evaluated
programs implemented at scale (23 percent) and by the government (15 percent). In the case of
study location, the survey results are more mixed: while individuals who preferred studies from
Colombia or Jamaica reported their lower standard of living and similar state capacity as reasons, a
substantial share also reported preferring the US studies, and listed a higher standard of living and
similar state capacity as reasons. One interpretation is that some policy-makers in Brazil may see
their municipalities as closer to developing countries, while others may see themselves as closer to
rich countries.
The results on belief updating (but not WTP) have another potential confound in interpretation:
the two larger-sample studies in practice estimated smaller effect sizes. This is a feature in the
four studies we use, and also more generally documented in the ECD literature (Barnett, 2011).
18Contrary to the Bayesian learning framework, the reduction in weight on the prior is smaller than the increase in
weight on the signal.
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What if participants simply update more (in proportional terms) for some reason in response to
small effect sizes? There is no clear theoretical reason to expect this. Nonetheless, we have some
unplanned variation which may shed light on this concern: in six of the fourteen conferences where
the experiment was conducted, we reported a different (smaller) effect-size for certain studies.
Specifically, for the small-sample studies, we truthfully reported an estimated effect size of the
study, but assessed at a much longer time period, which resulted in a smaller effect size. Appendix
Table A.3 tests whether the larger weight on large-sample study signals is less pronounced in those
conferences. Consistent with our initial interpretation, the weight placed on sample size does not
vary significantly across these conferences.
3.4 Potential deviations from Bayesian learning
In this section, we test for potential deviations from Bayesian learning by testing for asymmetric
updating, confirmation bias, and politically-motivated updating.
Confirmation bias and asymmetric updating. Confirmation bias is the tendency to acquire and
interpret information in a way that confirms one’s pre-existing beliefs (Nickerson, 1998). This
phenomenon has been studied in a number of settings, and debates exist as to its prevalence and
importance in causing polarization and making individuals immune to evidence (see e.g. Lord
et al., 1979; Kuhn & Lao, 1996; Nyhan & Reifler, 2010; Wood & Porter, 2019). It is natural to therefore
ask if political leaders and other policy-makers exhibit confirmation bias when faced with evidence
from research on policy effectiveness. Do policy-makers who start off with more positive beliefs
about a particular policy under-react to negative (disconfirming) information about that policy
relative to positive (confirming) information? And do policy-makers with negative priors do the
reverse? We test this by estimating equations of the form:
Posteriorijs = β1Priorij +β2(Signalij−Priorij)+β3(Signalij−Priorij)×PositiveSurpriseij + εij
(4)
where PositiveSurpriseij = 1{Signalij − Priorij > 0} is a dummy equal to 1 when the revealed
effect-size from the study is larger than the participant’s prior, and 0 otherwise. β3 > 0 implies
that participants place more weight on positive news than on negative news, while β3 < 0 would
imply placing more weight on negative news than on positive news.19
Table 5 reports the results. Column 1 shows that, on average, policy-makers do not react asym-
metrically to positive news relative to negative news. Columns 2 and 3 contrast the estimates for
participants with prior beliefs above versus below the median respectively, while Columns 4 and
5 do the same for participants in the top versus bottom quartiles instead. We find no evidence
of confirmation bias.20 Column 6 pools together the policy-makers with priors above and below
19See also Vivalt & Coville (2019). An alternative way to set up the estimating equation would be as in Equation 3,
interacting the prior and signal separately with PositiveSurprise. We choose to instead include the Signal−Posterior
term and its single interaction with PositiveSurprise for ease of exposition and interpretation, especially once we
examine politically-motivated information processing in Table 6.
20Columns 2 and 4 show that individuals with high prior beliefs do not react more to positive news. Columns 3 and
5 show that, if anything, policy-makers with low priors react more to positive rather than negative news, although the
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the median, and tests whether individuals react more to confirming rather than disconfirming ev-
idence; they do not.21 Column 7 repeats this for individuals in the top and bottom quartiles, and
finds a similar result. Altogether, we find no evidence for confirmation bias or asymmetric updat-
ing on average when policy-makers are presented with research evidence on policy effectiveness.
Politically-motivated information processing. Politically-motivated reasoning is thought to be a
source of persistent disagreement over facts (Kahan, 2016). There is evidence that providing infor-
mation on politically-charged topics can actually increase polarization, and that many individuals
neglect information that is inconsistent with their group’s position (e.g. Baekgaard et al. (2017);
Nyhan & Reifler (2010)). However, much of this evidence comes from student or Mturk samples
and often without incentives for truthful reporting. We have little evidence on potential biases in
political leaders’ belief-updating (Vivalt & Coville, 2019; Nellis et al., 2019). We thus randomized
messaging that (truthfully) revealed strong support for the ECD policy from past left-of-center
governments (Lula and Dilma’s governments from the Labor Party, PT). The partisan-support
message was: “In Brazil, the PT government strongly advocated for early-childhood development
policies. In 2007, Fundeb was created to include pre-school and nursery enrollment in the head-
count for federal transfers. Programs for pre-school and nursery construction, such as the pro-
Infancia program, were also launched during Lula’s government, and expanded during Dilma’s
administration.” This message is shown before the prior elicitation and briefly reiterated before
the WTP elicitation. The objective of the message was to create a partisan association between
ECD programs and the PT party, and to observe whether this influences belief-updating differen-
tially across left versus right-wing policy-makers. To study effects on priors and WTP, we estimate:
Yij = β0 + β1PartisanMessagei + β2Leftisti + β3PartisanMessagei ×Leftisti + εij (5)
where Yij is the policy-maker’s elicited prior or WTP; Leftisti is a binary variable equal to one
if the policy-maker self-reports as a leftist on an ideology scale; and PartisanMessagei is equal
to one if they received the randomized partisan message and zero otherwise. β3 captures the
differential effect of the partisan message on left-wing policy-makers.
To study effects on belief-updating, we estimate, separately for left-wing and right-wing policy-
makers, specifications of the form:
Posteriorijs = β1Priorij + β2(Signalij − Priorij) + β3(Signalij − Priorij)× PositiveSurpriseij+
β4(Signalij − Priorij)× PositiveSurpriseij × PartisanMessagei + εij (6)
Table 6 reports the results. Columns 1 and 2 present effects on priors and WTP from speci-
fication (5). We find no significant effects on either priors or WTP from providing the partisan
message, either on right-wing policy-makers (β1) or differentially for leftist policy-makers (β3), al-
though the estimates for WTP are somewhat imprecise. Columns 3 and 4 estimate (6) separately
for left-wing and right-wing policy-makers to study belief updating. We find no evidence that
estimates are imprecise.
21We define a variableConfirmingNews equal to 1 if an individual with an above-median prior receives a (still more)
positive signal or if an individual with a below-median prior receives a (still more) negative signal, and 0 otherwise.
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the partisan message causes leftists to begin to respond more to positive signals (β4 in Column 3),
nor does it cause rightists to respond more to negative signals (−β4 in Column 4). In an alterna-
tive specification in Column 6, we define a variable PartisanPreferredSignal and test whether
the partisan message causes policy-makers to respond more to messages which they ‘prefer’ (i.e.
signals which are high in the case of leftist participants and signals which are low in the case of
right-wing participants). Again, we find no evidence for this. If anything, the coefficient goes in
the wrong direction.
Overall, we find little evidence of politically-motivated beliefs, demand for information or pro-
cessing of information among our sample of policy-makers. However, there are important caveats
to this conclusion. First, it could be that the partisan message does not have an effect because indi-
viduals already knew of the support of past PT leaders for the policy. This was not our sense from
field work, but we cannot rule it out. Second, there is suggestive evidence in Table 6 that, in the ab-
sence of the partisan message, right-wing policy-makers do respond less to positive news. Third,
statistical power is limited in this analysis since the cross-randomization was only conducted in a
sub-sample. Finally, ECD programs are generally not a highly charged political topic. Politically-
motivated reasoning may well occur in other domains and contexts.
3.5 Demand/beliefs experiment: discussion
We have three main findings from the demand/beliefs experiment. First, political leaders in Brazil
value learning about research on policy effectiveness. They pay more for larger sample studies,
but not for developing-country studies. Second, they also change their beliefs when confronted
with evidence from research: they place substantial weight on the new information. They place
more weight on larger-sample studies, but again, not on developing-country studies. Third, we
have little evidence for specific deviations from the Bayesian framework we considered, such as
asymmetric updating, confirmation bias and politically-motivated processing of information. In
short, policy-makers seem to both value evidence and update their beliefs in a quite sophisticated
way.
WTP for implementation information. But does access to research lead to more effective policies
being adopted? At the very end of the demand/beliefs experiment, participants were given the
chance to purchase practical information on how to implement ECD policies, using a fresh budget
of lottery tickets. We interpret WTP for such advice as a revealed-preference proxy for interest in
implementing the policy. Since we experimentally vary bundles of study attributes provided—
effect size, developing country context, and large sample—and found that these affect posteriors,
we can use these attributes as instruments for participants’ posterior. Appendix Table A.4 shows
the results. We find that more positive beliefs about ECD programs—shaped through learning
about research findings—causally increase WTP for implementation information. While this pro-
vides clean, experimental evidence on the effect of research information on demand for policy
implementation via changed beliefs, in the next section we turn to a field experiment which mea-
sures policy adoption itself.
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4 Policy-Adoption Experiment
In this section, we describe a nationwide field experiment to test whether supplying the heads of
local governments with evidence from policy-effectiveness research influences the policies imple-
mented in their polities. We show that informing Brazilian mayors about the effectiveness of a
policy to increase tax compliance causally increases adoption of the policy in their municipality
1-2 years later.
4.1 Background: Taxpayer reminder letters
The essence of our policy-adoption experiment is to inform a treatment group of mayors about the
existing research evidence on a particular policy that has been shown to increase tax compliance:
reminder letters to taxpayers.
We chose this particular policy for three reasons. First, increasing tax compliance is important
to mayors: they reported considerable interest in increasing tax revenues in our focus groups and
scoping surveys. Over 90 percent of Brazilian municipalities raise taxes locally and enforcement of
municipal taxes is under the control of municipal governments. Like in most developing countries,
taxpayer compliance is a challenge in Brazil. A prominent think tank estimates that at least 20
percent of taxpayers do not comply with property taxes, for instance (De Cesare & Smolka, 2004).
Second, the effectiveness of reminder letters has been rigorously evaluated in multiple RCTs,
including two in Latin America (Coleman, 1996; Hasseldine et al., 2007; Del Carpio, 2013; Fellner
et al., 2013; Castro & Scartascini, 2015; Hallsworth et al., 2017). Such interventions have been found
to be surprisingly effective. For instance, Del Carpio (2013) finds that simple reminder letters
increased tax compliance in Peru by 10 percent, while letters that additionally included social-
norm language by emphasizing that most people pay their taxes on time increased compliance by
20 percent.
Third, reminder letters are inexpensive and relatively easy to implement, while not being obvi-
ously politically sensitive. On the one hand, this means that the policy we chose is likely positively
selected in terms of the potential for changes in policy-maker beliefs to translate into policy change.
On the other hand, we expect that reminder letters are likely an effective policy tool in part because
they are low-cost and easy to implement.
Reminder letters to taxpayers are uncommon but far from unheard of in Brazil. In our endline
survey for this experiment, 32 percent of control municipalities reported using some form of re-
minder messages to taxpayers. This sometimes involved sending letters, but also included other
communication channels such as text messages, flyers, and media advertising.
4.2 Experimental setting
The policy-adoption experiment was conducted at a large CNM convention—the Novos Gestores
meeting—for recently elected and re-elected mayors in October-November 2016. The convention
is held every four years to train mayors who are about to start their four-year term the following
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January. Each mayor participates in the conference for about two days, and can attend multiple
training sessions led by CNM staff. The sessions cover a variety of public policy areas, such as ed-
ucation, economic development, health, tourism, and local taxes. Multiple sessions run in parallel
throughout the conference.
The sample frame for the experiment was mayors attending the convention who represented
municipalities with populations between 5,000 and 100,000. The total sample consists of 1,818 mu-
nicipalities, which represents 45 percent of all mayoral administrations in Brazil in that population
range. Figure 3 shows the spatial distribution of the sample municipalities.
FIGURE 3: POLICY-ADOPTION EXPERIMENT:
SAMPLE MUNICIPALITIES
Table 7 provides descriptive statistics on the sample of mayors and municipalities for the
policy-adoption experiment. We see, for example, that almost 90 percent of the mayors are men;
about 60 percent have at least a bachelor degree; and 16 percent are in their second and last term
in office.22 The average municipality in the sample has a population of about 21,000 residents.
22This low share of mayors in their second term is explained, in part, by the political crisis Brazil was going through at
the time of the most recent municipal elections (2016), which led to a decrease in the proportion of incumbent politicians
winning re-election.
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4.3 Experimental design
Mayors attending the conference were randomized into treatment (n=881) and control (n=937)
groups.23 All mayors were free to attend any of CNM’s regular Novos Gestores training sessions,
but only mayors in the treatment group were invited, by email and text message, to attend our
research information session. The session was advertised as being on the topic of how to increase
local tax revenues, and was framed as a training session organized by CNM as well as researchers
at Columbia and Harvard Universities. Since participation was optional, our experiment should
be thought of as having an encouragement design. Table 7 shows that the treatment and control
groups are largely balanced on mayor’s characteristics as well as municipal characteristics.
The information session lasted 45 minutes and was led by an experienced instructor. The in-
structor began by introducing and defining policy impact, cost-effectiveness, and impact evalua-
tion research. She then provided a description of taxpayer reminder letters, including presenting
an example template. Next, she presented the findings (i.e. the estimated effect sizes) of a set of
rigorous studies evaluating the impact of taxpayer reminder letters. A list of reminder letter char-
acteristics found to be effective in inducing taxpayers to pay their taxes on time—stating the tax
payment deadline; mentioning the possibility of fines and audits for not paying taxes on time; and
stating that most people pay their taxes on time—was emphasized, and effect sizes were provided
where possible.
The information presented was simplified and the presentation was concise. We avoided jargon
and regression tables. The 30-minute presentation was followed by 15 minutes for questions from
the audience.24 At the end of the session, mayors received a professionally-produced policy brief
with the same information content as the presentation, including references to the cited papers.25
4.4 Data
To measure how the research information provided affected policy adoption and political leaders’
beliefs, we conducted in-depth phone surveys of relevant municipal officials from treatment and
control municipalities 15 to 24 months after the session. We attempted to reach the bureaucrat in
charge of implementing tax policy in each municipality, as well as the mayor him- or herself.26
23The randomization was stratified on the mayor’s education level, whether the mayor was term-limited, the average
education level among public employees in the municipality, and the municipality’s population size, Gini coefficient,
and region. A slightly larger share of municipalities was assigned to the control group due to logistical concerns asso-
ciated with our capacity to manage a large number of treatment group participants and the capacity of the room that
CNM designated for our intervention.
24During the 15 minutes reserved for open discussions with mayors, mayors often asked interesting questions about
reminder letters and other alternative policies on tax compliance: for example, whether the effects would be the same
if the messages were sent by email or text messages, whether the policy could be used to encourage tax debtors to
pay their balance, and whether financial incentives such as discounts or lotteries for paying taxes on time are effective
policies. We avoided providing confident answers to such questions.
25Appendix Figures A.8, A.9, A.10, and A.11 show the policy brief.
26Typically, secretaries of finance are responsible for the tax division in Brazilian municipalities. Nevertheless, we
specifically asked municipalities’ telephone attendants to pass the call on to the person in charge of the tax division.
Once we were transferred, we confirmed whether the person actually held that position or asked to get the phone
number of the person in charge of implementing tax policy.
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The survey was supervised by a research assistant, and conducted by a team of nine surveyors
who were blinded to treatment status and the research hypotheses. When the survey ended after
10 months of phone calls, we had successfully interviewed at least one person in 81 percent of our
sample of municipalities—75 percent of the chief tax bureaucrats and 50 percent of the mayors in
the sample.27 There was no differential attrition between treatment and control groups, and ob-
servable characteristics of the successfully contacted municipalities are similar across both groups,
as reported in Table 7.
The survey lasted approximately 15 minutes. The key questions asked were whether the mu-
nicipality sends taxpayers reminders to pay their taxes, and whether the messages feature the
characteristics described in the information session and evaluated in the literature: mentioning the
due date, the possibility of fines or audits, and language regarding the social norm of paying taxes
on time. We also elicited beliefs about the likely impact of such a policy, even if the municipality
reported not using such reminders. In addition, we asked questions that served as attention and
comprehension checks as well as placebo questions on which we would expect null effects of the
treatment.
In addition to the phone survey, we gathered demographic, electoral, and budgetary data from
official sources for all municipalities for which such data is available.28 It is not possible to observe
tax compliance itself in the administrative data so our primary outcome is whether municipalities
implemented the policy. Since concerns about experimenter demand effects or other reporting
biases may arise for reports from mayors, we separately report responses from tax department
bureaucrats and mayors.
4.5 Results
Participation in information sessions. 37.9 percent of the mayors in the treatment group chose to
attend our session. In contrast, less than 1 percent of control group mayors attended the session.
The opportunity costs of attending—foregoing the opportunity to attend other parallel training
sessions or conducting meetings with other politicians and officials—were high. Moreover, some
mayors did not have accurate contact information stored in the CNM system, and thus did not
receive our invitation messages at all. We therefore consider 37.9 percent to be a fairly high rate of
treatment group participation.
Appendix Table A.5 reports predictors of participation in the research information session.
Younger and college-educated mayors are 7 and 15 percentage points more likely to participate
27We were not able to make any contact with 10 percent of the sample municipalities, due to not being able to locate
a working phone number. This share was also balanced across treatment and control groups. On average, many hours
of work were needed before we could talk to the chief tax bureaucrats and mayors over the phone, mainly collecting
municipalities’ phone numbers. Not all Brazilian municipalities publish or have updated contact information on their
websites, so we collected phone numbers through google searches, facebook, by calling other local institutions such as
hospitals and schools, etc.
28Demographic data is available from the Brazilian Statistical Office (IBGE). Brazil’s Superior Electoral Court provides
data on electoral outcomes and mayors’ characteristics. Budgetary data was retrieved from the National Treasury, which
compiles and releases self-reported accounting records from all Brazilian municipalities every year.
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than others, but term-limited mayors are no less likely to participate than mayors in their first
term. None of the municipal characteristics, such as poverty rates, inequality, or income per capita,
predict participation.
Policy adoption. We find that a mayor attending the research information session leads to a 10
percentage point increase in the use of reminder letters to taxpayers—an increase of 33 percent
over the proportion of control group municipalities that had started using such a reminder policy
at some point in the past. Table 8 presents Treatment-on-Treated (ToT) estimates, using random-
ized treatment status as an instrument for participation in the information session.29 The outcome
variable is a dummy equal to one if the respondent reports that the carefully-described policy is
used in their municipality and zero otherwise. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality
level. In Column 1, the ToT coefficient is 10.3 percentage points (s.e.=5.3 percentage points), com-
pared to a base of 31.7 percentage points in the control group. Adding controls in Column 2 leaves
the point estimate largely unchanged. Column 3 drops respondents who failed an attention check,
again leaving the coefficient unchanged.30 Most importantly, the point estimates are very similar if
we restrict attention to responses from mayors (Column 4) or tax department officials (Column 5).
Given that we have little concern about tax department officials misreporting details of tax com-
pliance policies differentially between treatment and control groups, this increases our confidence
that the effects we estimate are not driven by reporting biases.
Appendix Tables A.7 and A.8 investigate heterogeneity in treatment effects by mayor’s and mu-
nicipal characteristics. We find suggestive evidence that leftist mayors respond more to receiving
research information, but the estimates are not precise enough for statistical significance. We have
little evidence for heterogeneity by term-limits for mayors, population size of municipality, and
measures of municipal government human capital. Appendix Table A.9 reports effects separately
for the different design components of taxpayer reminder letters, and shows that the effects are
fairly similar on the probability of using letters emphasizing the due date, mentioning the threat
of audits/penalties, and mentioning social norm language, although the latter is a larger effect in
relative terms, since it is particularly unlikely to be used in the control municipalities. Finally, Ap-
pendix Table A.10 reports no effects on a placebo question (the use of e-procurement in municipal
government), and reports no effects on the use of financial incentives for compliance with taxes—a
common policy which might conceivably have been seen as a substitute for the reminder-letters
policy.
Beliefs. We also measured beliefs about the effectiveness of reminder letters, which—especially
given the evidence presented in Section 3—we consider a plausible mechanism through which
the ultimate impact on policy adoption may arise. We asked respondents about the likely effect
of the policy in their municipality, whether or not the policy was currently implemented. We
compare their stated beliefs with the estimated effect sizes shared with participating mayors in
29Appendix Table A.6 presents the Intent-to-Treat estimates.
30The attention check was: “The tax reminders sent informed taxpayers that the Brazilian constitution was reformed
in 1988”. Since we consider this exceedingly unlikely as text for a tax reminder, we infer that respondents who answer
‘yes’ to this question are simply not paying attention or following the questions.
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the research information session and policy briefs provided.31 Appendix Table A.11 reports that
beliefs are more accurate in the treatment group even 15-24 months after treatment. Specifically,
the absolute deviation of beliefs from the effect sizes mentioned in the research information session
is 20 percent lower than in the control group. The fact that the beliefs are more accurate not just
among mayors, but also among tax-department bureaucrats, implies information-flow within the
municipal government, perhaps made easier by providing the participants with shareable policy
briefs.
4.6 Policy-adoption experiment: discussion
This experiment has one simple but important result: when political leaders in Brazil are provided
information from research on the impact of a cost-effective policy, they change the actual policies
in use in their polities. This implies that, consistent with the findings from our demand/beliefs
experiment, policy-makers are open to new evidence; care about policy effectiveness; and have at
least some capacity and desire to translate evidence into policy change.
Two caveats to this interpretation are worth noting. First, we cannot rule out that the estimated
effects are driven in part by mayors simply learning of the existence of taxpayer reminder poli-
cies, rather than due to the quantitative estimates of their impact from research. As noted above,
however, taxpayer reminder policies are far from unknown in Brazil, with about a third of mu-
nicipalities already using some form of such reminders. Moreover, we found evidence of more
accurate beliefs in the treatment group. Thus, it seems unlikely that the impact on policy adop-
tion would have been the same if we had merely described the policy. Second, we considered
a policy that is inexpensive and relatively easy to implement. Other effective policies may have
higher up-front costs, be more technically demanding, or be more politically sensitive, in which
case changing beliefs about effectiveness may not as readily translate into policy change. On the
other hand, our policy adoption experiment also does not capture the numerous, less direct chan-
nels through which research may ultimately influence policy practice.
5 Conclusion
Policy is important for economic development. What role can policy-effectiveness research play in
spurring the spread of effective policies and the abandonment of ineffective ones? One possibility
is that lack of (access to) research information is not a binding constraint on policy choice, for
example because political leaders are self-interested and electoral competitive pressures too weak
to motivate the effort required to change policy, or because leaders have limited real power over the
policies in use. Alternatively, frictions may constrain political leaders’ access to existing research.
31Mayors were informed that the estimated effect sizes found in the existing research studies were 10 percent, 12
percent, and 20 percent, depending on the variants of the policy (i.e. tax payment due dates, risk of audits/penalties,
and social norms regarding paying taxes).
23
In this paper, we investigate how informing political leaders about research findings affects pol-
icy beliefs and practice. Using experiments with the elected heads of Brazil’s local governments—
mayors—we first show that political leaders value access to impact evaluations, and update their
beliefs when informed of the research findings. Mayors (and other local policy-makers in our sam-
ple) appear to be fairly sophisticated consumers of accessible research, for example paying more
for studies—such as those with a large sample size—that subsequently affect their beliefs more.
In the second half of the paper, we show that providing mayors with research findings document-
ing positive impact of an inexpensive and easy-to-implement policy increases the probability that
their municipality implements the policy by 10 percentage points. Making research information
directly and easily available to policy-makers therefore appears to influence policy. This suggests
that information frictions may play an important role in explaining failures to adopt effective poli-
cies.
It is arguably surprising that such information frictions persist. After all, even if political lead-
ers themselves do not read academic journals, information frictions should generate incentives for
actors interested in enhancing social welfare to access academic research and connect policy re-
search with practice to eliminate these frictions. Empirically, the reach of think tanks and other or-
ganizations that institutionalize and scale up transmission of research findings to political leaders
still appears limited in developing countries. We hope that future research will expand our under-
standing of how research’s impact on policy practice can be better understood and enhanced.
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TABLE 1: DEMAND/BELIEFS EXPERIMENT:
SUMMARY STATS AND BALANCE
VARIABLES Mean Control ∆ Developing ∆ Large
Mayors’ Characteristics
Male 87.87 -1.3211 -4.0462***
Age 48.45 -0.0997 -0.4731
College 58.43 2.7315 0.0545
2nd Term 19.97 0.3243 -0.1866
Leftist Political Party 37.57 -1.0846 1.7034
Municipalities’ Characteristics
Population 24.39 1.4364 1.2248
College Population 484.73 -7.6688 1.7868
Public Adm College 33.11 -0.9649* -0.8442
Poverty 26.62 0.4999 0.4229
Gini 49.91 0.4802* 0.4444
Big South 49.26 -0.8158 -1.1354
Per Capita Income 0.45 -0.0280 -0.0177
Kids in School (0-3) 19.24 -1.0415** 0.0754
Kids in School (4-5) 78.68 -0.4169 0.1541
ECD Policy Survey Characteristics
Mayor 50.59 -0.2295 -1.4094
Prof Politician 29.88 0.7786 -0.4208
Leftist Scale 21.89 -2.4781 -1.9016
Implemented ECD 41.86 0.3214 -3.1046
Heard ECD 25.74 -0.7741 -0.0720
Observations 676 1,371 1,371
Round 1 and 2 1 and 2 1 and 2
Clusters 676 766 766
Notes: OLS results. Sample mean of control observations. Control ob-
servations are those for which dummy developing and dummy large are
equal to zero, where dummy developing is equal to one for Jamaica and
Colombia, and dummy large is equal to one for Colombia and US. Each
cell reports the estimated coefficient of a regression of each characteris-
tic on a dummy which is equal to one for Jamaica and Colombia and
zero otherwise (Developing), and on a dummy which is equal to one
for Colombia and US and zero otherwise (Large). Male-Leftist Politi-
cal Party (1/0, mayors belonging to a center-leftist party according to
historical political platforms), are characteristics of the mayor that runs
the municipality. Population indicates municipality number of inhab-
itants (in thousands). College Population indicates municipality share
of adults with college degrees. Public Administration College indicates
the share of municipal public employees with college degrees. Poverty
refers to municipalities’ poverty rate. Gini refers to the Gini coefficient
of municipality. Big South indicates the share of municipalities from the
south, southeast and mid-west regions; and 0 are north and northeast
regions. Per Capita Income indicates municipality monthly income per
capita. Kids in School (0-3) indicates municipality share of kids 0-3 years
old that attend pre-school education. Kids in School (4-5) indicates mu-
nicipality share of kids 4-5 years old that attend pre-school education.
Mayor-Heard ECD are characteristics self-reported by participants in the
survey experiment. Professional Politician indicates whether the partic-
ipant occupied an elective position in the previous term. Leftist Scale
indicates whether the participant self-identified as leftist (0-4) on a 0-10
scale. Implemented ECD indicates whether the participant reported the
municipality implemented a ECD program before. Heard ECD indicates
whether the participant reported that he/she had heard about ECD pro-
grams before. Robust standard errors are clustered at the individual level.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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TABLE 2: DEMAND/BELIEFS EXPERIMENT:
WILLINGNESS TO PAY BY STUDY CHARACTERISTICS
(1) (2) (3)
LHS Variable WTP WTP WTP
Large 3.7704*** 2.3414 4.3478***
(0.7908) (2.3956) (1.0160)
Developing 0.3332 1.5766 -0.3308
(0.7902) (2.3964) (1.0038)
Observations 2,578 766 1,812
Round 1 and 2 1 2
Clusters 766 766 605
Mean LHS 44.73 48.52 43.12
SD LHS 31.84 33.12 31.15
Notes: OLS results. The dependent variable is will-
ingness to pay, which is elicited in two different
rounds. Developing is a dummy which is equal to one
for Jamaica and Colombia and zero otherwise. Large
is a dummy which is equal to one for Colombia and
US and zero otherwise. Difference in number of clus-
ters between columns 2 and 3 is due to a different ex-
perimental design of last CNM conference, in which
only one study was offered for purchase. Mean LHS is
the mean WTP on the left-hand side of each equation.
SD LHS is the standard deviation of WTP on the left-
hand side of each equation. Robust standard errors
clustered at the individual level are in parentheses. *
p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. P-value of Large
(column 2) = Large (column 3) test is .496. P-value of
Developing (column 2) = Developing (column 3) test
is .516.
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TABLE 3: DEMAND/BELIEFS EXPERIMENT:
BELIEF UPDATING
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
LHS Variable Posterior Posterior Posterior Posterior Posterior
Prior 0.6850*** 0.5906*** 0.8066*** 0.5512*** 0.6845***
(0.0221) (0.0295) (0.0248) (0.0302) (0.0247)
Signal 0.3190*** 0.3729*** 0.2476*** 0.4166*** 0.3214***
(0.0199) (0.0261) (0.0241) (0.0301) (0.0223)
Observations 1,188 702 486 544 929
Round 1 and 2 1 2 1 1 and 2
Beliefs About Municipality Municipality Municipality Random Study Municipality
BDM Price = 0 No No No No Yes
Clusters 702 702 486 544 529
Notes: OLS results. The dependent variables are posterior beliefs, which are declared after successfully
buying the results from a study in each round. Prior is the belief of the respondent about the effect, right
before buying some study. Signal is the bought study’s effect size. When dealing with a second update in
posteriors, the first update is treated as a prior. Difference in clusters between columns 2 and 3 is due in
part to a different experimental design of last CNM conference, in which only one study was offered for
purchase. Beliefs About specifies which location the beliefs are elicited for, either the respondent’s own
municipality (columns 1, 2, 3, and 5) or one of the four possible study locations (column 4). BDM Price =
0 indicates whether participant received the information regardless of their WTP. Robust standard errors
clustered at the individual level are in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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TABLE 4: DEMAND/BELIEFS EXPERIMENT:
BELIEF UPDATING: WEIGHT PLACED ON LARGE-SAMPLE AND DEVELOPING-COUNTRY
STUDIES
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
LHS Variable Posterior Posterior Posterior Posterior Posterior
Prior 0.6434*** 0.5600*** 0.7715*** 0.6685*** 0.6701***
(0.0374) (0.0531) (0.0477) (0.0543) (0.0408)
Signal 0.3200*** 0.3738*** 0.2409*** 0.3351*** 0.3018***
(0.0287) (0.0398) (0.0386) (0.0429) (0.0320)
Prior*Developing -0.0161 -0.0255 -0.0269 -0.0920 -0.0154
(0.0401) (0.0599) (0.0501) (0.0574) (0.0451)
Signal*Developing 0.0231 0.0128 0.0487 0.0682 0.0350
(0.0356) (0.0516) (0.0488) (0.0578) (0.0390)
Prior*Large -0.0567 -0.0896 -0.0373 -0.0558 -0.0998*
(0.0492) (0.0689) (0.0633) (0.0713) (0.0543)
Signal*Large 0.3377*** 0.4072*** 0.2736*** 0.2729** 0.3880***
(0.0736) (0.0959) (0.1035) (0.1170) (0.0845)
Observations 1,188 702 486 544 929
Round 1 and 2 1 2 1 1 and 2
Beliefs About Municipality Municipality Municipality Random Study Municipality
BDM Price = 0 No No No No Yes
Clusters 702 702 486 544 529
P-value Prior*Dev.=Signal*Dev. 0.582 0.717 0.419 0.142 0.525
P-value Prior*Large=Signal*Large 0.001 0.002 0.051 0.071 0.000
Notes: OLS results. The dependent variables are posterior beliefs, which are declared after successfully buying the results from
a study in each round. Prior is the belief of the respondent about the effect, right before buying some study. Signal is the
bought study’s effect size. When dealing with a second update in posteriors, the first update is treated as a prior. Developing
is a dummy which is equal to one for Jamaica and Colombia and zero otherwise. Large is a dummy which is equal to one for
Colombia and US and zero otherwise. Difference in clusters between columns 2 and 3 is due in part to a different experimental
design of last CNM conference, in which only one study was offered for purchase. Beliefs About specifies which location the
beliefs are elicited for, either the respondent’s own municipality (columns 1, 2, 3, and 5) or one of the four possible study
locations (column 4). BDM Price = 0 indicates whether participant received the information regardless of their WTP. Robust
standard errors clustered at the individual level are in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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TABLE 5: DEMAND/BELIEFS EXPERIMENT:
TESTING FOR ASYMMETRIC UPDATING AND CONFIRMATION BIAS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Priors Full Sample Above the Median Below the Median Top Quartile Bottom Quartile Above/Below Median Top/Bottom Quartile
LHS Variable Posterior Posterior Posterior Posterior Posterior Posterior Posterior
Prior 1.0196*** 0.9885*** 1.1833*** 0.9871*** 1.2293*** 1.0167*** 1.0128***
(0.0218) (0.0250) (0.0612) (0.0280) (0.0859) (0.0158) (0.0187)
Signal-Prior 0.3489*** 0.3104*** -0.0306 0.3106*** -0.4659 0.3369*** 0.3440***
(0.0522) (0.0573) (0.3009) (0.0609) (0.7954) (0.0257) (0.0288)
Signal-Prior * Positive Surprise -0.0406 0.0025 0.2889 -0.0199 0.7351
(0.0690) (0.1051) (0.3215) (0.1271) (0.8146)
Signal-Prior * Confirming News -0.0939 -0.1052
(0.0620) (0.0823)
Observations 929 548 381 440 276 929 716
Round 1 and 2 1 and 2 1 and 2 1 and 2 1 and 2 1 and 2 1 and 2
Beliefs About Municipality Municipality Municipality Municipality Municipality Municipality Municipality
BDM Price = 0 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 529 375 278 316 211 529 459
P-value (Signal-Prior)=Positive Surprise (Above vs Below Median) 0.3963
P-value (Signal-Prior)=Positive Surprise (Top vs Bottom Quartile) 0.3573
Notes: OLS results. The dependent variables are posterior beliefs, which are declared after successfully buying the results from a study in each round. Prior is the belief of the respondent about the effect, right before buying some
study. Signal is the bought study’s effect size. When dealing with a second update in posteriors, the first update is treated as a prior. Positive Surprise is a dummy which is equal to one if the bought study’s effect is greater than
the respondent’s prior about the effect. Confirming News is a dummy which is equal to one if the respondent’s prior about the effect was above the median/top quartile (below the median/bottom quartile) and the bought study’s
effect is greater (smaller) than the respondent’s prior. Beliefs About specifies which location the beliefs are elicited for, either the respondent’s own municipality or one of the four possible study locations. BDM Price = 0 indicates
whether participant received the information regardless of their WTP. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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TABLE 6: DEMAND/BELIEFS EXPERIMENT:
PARTISAN SUPPORT
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Political View Any Any Left Right Any Any
LHS Variable Prior WTP Posterior Posterior Posterior Posterior
Partisan Message -0.0215 -1.7860
(0.0273) (4.1797)
Leftist -0.0433 -6.9875
(0.0411) (6.1908)
Partisan Message*Leftist 0.0775 10.6305
(0.0609) (8.6526)
Prior 0.9418*** 1.0487*** 1.0271*** 1.0034***
(0.0721) (0.0381) (0.0344) (0.0282)
Signal-Prior 0.2723 0.4572*** 0.4134*** 0.3055***
(0.1764) (0.0992) (0.0874) (0.0411)
Signal-Prior * Positive Surprise 0.1478 -0.2038* -0.1287
(0.2282) (0.1222) (0.1065)
Signal-Prior * Positive Surprise * Partisan Message -0.0356 0.0491
(0.1555) (0.0822)
Signal-Prior * Positive Surprise * Leftist 0.0918
(0.1309)
Signal-Prior * Positive Surprise * Leftist * Partisan Message -0.0404
(0.1535)
Signal-Prior * Partisan-Preferred Signal 0.1671*
(0.0895)
Signal-Prior * Partisan-Preferred Signal * Partisan Message -0.1564
(0.1057)
Observations 312 881 71 232 303 303
Round 1 1 and 2 1 and 2 1 and 2 1 and 2 1 and 2
Beliefs About Municipality Municipality Municipality Municipality
BDM Price = 0 Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 312 341 40 128 168 168
Mean LHS 0.388 49.25
Notes: OLS results. In column 1, the dependent variable is respondents’ priors. In column 2, the dependent variable is willingness to pay for studies.
In columns 3-6, the dependent variable is posterior beliefs, which are declared after successfully buying the results from a study in each round. Partisan
Message is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the respondent received a message linking early childhood education policies to a leftist party
in Brazil. Leftist is a dummy which is equal to one if the participant self-identified as leftist (0-4) on a 0-10 scale. Prior is the belief of the respondent about
the effect, right before buying some study. Signal is the bought study’s effect size. When dealing with a second update in posteriors, the first update is
treated as a prior. Beliefs About specifies which location the beliefs are elicited for, either the respondent’s own municipality or one of the four possible
study locations. BDM Price = 0 indicates whether participant received the information regardless of their WTP. Mean LHS is the average of the left-hand
side variable of each equation. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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TABLE 7: POLICY-ADOPTION EXPERIMENT:
SUMMARY STATS AND BALANCE
at Baseline at Endline
VARIABLES Mean Control ∆ Treatment Mean Control ∆ Treatment
Mayors’ Characteristics
Male 88.26 1.41 90.01 -0.14
Age 46.76 1.32*** 47.08 1.61***
College 57.74 -0.76 57.66 0.73
2nd Term 15.69 1.56 15.18 0.91
Leftist Political Party 32.98 2.10 32.76 1.36
Municipalities’ Characteristics
Population 20.86 -0.06 20.23 0.06
College Population 5.17 -0.15 5.47 -0.14
Public Adm College 32.60 0.84 33.51 -0.01
Poverty 26.41 -0.27 23.05 0.11
Gini 50.33 -0.19 49.37 0.17
Big South 51.01 -0.62 59.92 -2.36
Per Capita Income 457.64 3.42 489.23 2.78
Local Taxes Revenues (2010-15) 6.06 0.09 6.40 0.08
Joint F-test (p-value) 0.18 0.17
Follow-Up Survey Response Rate
Municipality 80.15 1.69
Mayor 51.65 -2.28
Finance Staff 75.03 0.80
Notes: Sample means by experimental group and differences in means between groups at baseline
and endline. There were 937 (751) municipalities in control group and 881 (721) in treatment group
at baseline (endline). Male-Leftist Political Party (1/0, mayors belonging to a center-leftist party ac-
cording to historical political platforms), are characteristics of the mayor that runs the municipality.
Population indicates municipality number of inhabitants (in thousands). College Population indicates
municipality share of adults with college degrees. Public Administration College indicates the share of
municipal public employees with college degrees. Poverty refers to municipalities’ poverty rate. Gini
refers to the Gini coefficient of municipality. Big South indicates the share of municipalities from the
south, southeast and mid-west regions; and 0 are north and northeast regions. Per Capita Income indi-
cates municipality monthly income per capita. Local Tax Revenues (2010-2015) indicates the average
share of municipal tax revenues on total municipal revenues from 2010 to 2015. Joint significance F-
test p-value, and follow-up survey response rate—municipality, mayor and finance staff—at endline.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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TABLE 8: POLICY-ADOPTION EXPERIMENT:
POLICY ADOPTION: TAX REMINDERS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
LHS Variable Adopted Adopted Adopted Adopted Adopted
Information Session 0.1031* 0.1073** 0.1011* 0.1148 0.1076*
(0.0531) (0.0522) (0.0539) (0.0776) (0.0649)
Observations 2,271 2,269 2,054 912 1,357
Respondent All All All Mayor Finance Staff
Attention Check No No Yes No No
Mayor Characteristics No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipal Characteristics No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clusters (Municipalities) 1465 1464 1412 912 1357
Mean Control 0.317 0.317 0.298 0.367 0.283
Notes: 2SLS estimation results. The dependent variable is a dummy which takes the value of
1 if respondent says the policy was adopted in municipality, and 0 otherwise. Information Ses-
sion is a dummy which takes the value of 1 if the municipality’s mayor attended the informa-
tion session about tax reminders. This last variable is instrumented with treatment assignment.
Attention Check refers to whether respondents that answered positively to the attention check
component of the reminders policy are excluded from the model, where the attention check
was “The tax reminders sent informed taxpayers that the Brazilian constitution was reformed
in 1988”’. Mayors’ characteristics included in the model are: Male (1/0); Age above-below me-
dian (1/0); College (1/0); 2nd Term (1/0) and Leftist Political Party (1/0, mayors belonging to
a center-leftist party according to historical political platforms). Municipalities’ characteristics
included in the model are: Population above-below median (1/0); College Population above-
below median (1/0); College Public Administration employees above-below median (1/0);
Poverty above-below median (1/0); Gini above-below median (1/0); Big South (1/0, where
1 are south, southeast and mid-west regions; and 0 are north and northeast regions); monthly
Per Capita Income above-below median (1/0); Local Tax Revenues share above-below median
(1/0);. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level are in parenthesis. * p < 0.1,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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TABLE A.1: DEMAND/BELIEFS EXPERIMENT:
PRIOR BELIEFS
Beliefs About N Mean SD Effect Size in Study
Own Municipality 900 0.40 (0.22) -
123; Michigan 145 0.46 (0.22) 0.87
130; Jamaica 160 0.41 (0.20) 0.91
1420; Colombia 152 0.38 (0.19) 0.26
4667; USA 148 0.49 (0.21) 0.15
Notes: Sample mean and standard deviation of participants’ priors. Be-
liefs About refers to the location about which the prior is asked. N indi-
cates the number of observations in each location, and the last column
reports the effect size described in the corresponding study.
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TABLE A.2: DEMAND/BELIEFS EXPERIMENT:
WILLINGNESS TO PAY: OTHER DETERMINANTS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
LHS Variable WTP WTP WTP WTP
Mayors’ Characteristics
Male 6.63** 6.34**
(3.21) (3.19)
Age -1.43 -1.63
(2.11) (2.12)
College 1.79 3.14
(2.16) (2.21)
2nd Term 2.55 2.89
(2.58) (2.87)
Leftist Political Party 1.49 0.93
(2.13) (2.20)
Municipalities’ Characteristics
Population 1.95 1.29
(2.24) (2.22)
College Population -0.10 0.00
(2.78) (2.81)
Public Adm College 1.66 0.23
(2.30) (2.31)
Poverty 1.82 0.56
(5.70) (5.61)
Gini -0.91 -0.70
(2.51) (2.49)
Big South 0.36 2.23
(4.66) (4.66)
Per Capita Income -0.74 -0.91
(5.10) (4.96)
Kids in School (0-3) 1.37 0.87
(2.32) (2.33)
Kids in School (4-5) 1.99 1.95
(2.42) (2.39)
ECD Policy Survey Characteristics
Mayor -0.89 -0.95
(2.08) (2.16)
Prof Politician -0.69 -1.58
(2.34) (2.47)
Leftist Scale 0.51 0.13
(2.51) (2.57)
Implemented ECD 11.69*** 11.90***
(2.39) (2.50)
Heard ECD 6.82** 6.54**
(2.68) (2.77)
Observations 2,578 2,578 2,578 2,578
Clusters 766 766 766 766
Mean LHS 44.73 44.73 44.73 44.73
Notes: OLS results. The dependent variable is willingness to pay, which is
elicited in two different rounds. We expressed all continuous variables as
indicators of above/below the median of the distribution of municipalities.
Mayors’ characteristics: Male (1/0); Age above-below median (1/0); Col-
lege (1/0); 2nd term (1/0); Leftist Political Party (1/0, mayors belonging to
a center-leftist party according to historical political platforms). Municipal-
ities’ characteristics: Population above-below median (1/0); College Pop-
ulation above-below median (1/0); Public Administration College above-
below median (1/0); Poverty above-below median (1/0); Gini above-below
median (1/0); Big south (1/0, where 1 are south, southeast and mid-west
regions; and 0 are north and northeast regions); Per Capita Income above-
below median; Kids in School (0-3) above-below median (1/0) of the share
of kids 0-3 years old that attend pre-school education; Kids in School (4-5)
above-below median (1/0) of the share of kids 4-5 years old that attend pre-
school education. ECD Policy Survey characteristics: Mayor (1/0); Profes-
sional Politician (1/0); Leftist Scale (1/0); Implemented ECD (1/0) indicates
whether the participant reported the municipality implemented a ECD pro-
gram before; Heard ECD (1/0) indicates whether the participant reported
that he/she had heard about ECD programs before. Mean LHS is the mean
WTP on the left-hand side of each equation. Robust standard errors clus-
tered at the individual level are in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01
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TABLE A.3: DEMAND/BELIEFS EXPERIMENT:
BELIEF UPDATING: LARGE-SAMPLE AND DEVELOPING-COUNTRY STUDIES - DIFFERENT
EFFECT SIZES
(1) (2) (3) (4)
LHS Variable Posterior Posterior Posterior Posterior
Prior 0.5871*** 0.4270*** 0.7073*** 0.5587***
(0.0641) (0.1160) (0.0699) (0.1026)
Signal 0.3274*** 0.4087*** 0.2647*** 0.3677***
(0.0412) (0.0663) (0.0507) (0.0607)
Prior*Developing 0.0253 0.0574 -0.0135 -0.0606
(0.0653) (0.1096) (0.0792) (0.0948)
Signal*Developing 0.0142 -0.0069 0.0384 0.0511
(0.0462) (0.0747) (0.0610) (0.0752)
Prior*Large -0.0328 0.0062 -0.0527 0.0834
(0.0771) (0.1325) (0.0935) (0.1217)
Signal*Large 0.3337*** 0.2856* 0.4207** 0.1615
(0.1133) (0.1560) (0.1634) (0.1720)
Prior*Long-run 0.0839 0.1928 0.0717 0.1336
(0.0859) (0.1411) (0.0954) (0.1258)
Signal*Long-run 0.0097 -0.0537 0.0195 -0.0461
(0.0675) (0.1008) (0.0831) (0.0942)
Prior*Developing*Long-run -0.1258 -0.2390 -0.0788 -0.1214
(0.0975) (0.1549) (0.1034) (0.1299)
Signal*Developing*Long-run 0.1480 0.2835* 0.0804 0.2361*
(0.0939) (0.1452) (0.1076) (0.1346)
Prior*Large*Long-run -0.0193 -0.1345 0.1562 -0.1292
(0.1140) (0.1730) (0.1246) (0.1571)
Signal*Large*Long-run -0.0442 0.1089 -0.4122* 0.0469
(0.1750) (0.2398) (0.2127) (0.2541)
Observations 929 493 436 493
Round 1 and 2 1 2 1
Beliefs About Municipality Municipality Municipality Random Study
BDM Price = 0 Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 529 493 436 493
Notes: OLS results. The dependent variables is posterior beliefs, which are declared after successfully
buying the results from a study in each round. Prior is the belief of the respondent about the effect, right
before buying some study. Signal is the bought study’s effect size. When dealing with a second update in
posteriors, the first update is treated as a prior. Developing is a dummy which is equal to one for Jamaica
and Colombia and zero otherwise. Large is a dummy which is equal to one for Colombia and US and
zero otherwise. Beliefs About specifies which location the beliefs are elicited for, either the respondent’s
own municipality or one of the four possible study locations. BDM Price = 0 indicates whether participant
received the information regardless of their WTP. Long-run is a dummy which is equal to one (zero) for
the six (eight) conferences in which the informed effect sizes were assessed in adulthood for 0.38 (0.91) for
Jamaica, 0.50 (0.87) for Michigan, or just continue to be assessed shortly after the intervention was over
0.18 (0.15) for USA, 0.26 (0.26) for Colombia. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are
in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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TABLE A.4: DEMAND/BELIEFS EXPERIMENT:
VALUATION OF IMPLEMENTATION REPORT
(1) (2)
LHS Variable Implementation Report Implementation Report
Final Posterior 14.9885*** 47.6139**
(5.4457) (23.3722)
Observations 685 685
Instruments Avg Signal
Clusters 685 685
Mean LHS 59.68 59.68
Notes: OLS (column 1) and 2SLS (column 2) results. Dependent variable is
willingness to pay for a policy implementation report. Final Posterior is the
value of the last updated belief, that being after buying one or two results.
Instrument is either the received signal or the average of the received signals
in the case the participant have bought two results. Mean LHS is the average
policy implementation report valuation on the left-hand side of each equa-
tion. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are in parenthe-
ses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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TABLE A.5: POLICY-ADOPTION EXPERIMENT:
INDIVIDUAL AND MUNICIPAL PREDICTORS OF SESSION PARTICIPATION
(1) (2)
LHS Variable Information Session Information Session
Mayors’ Characteristics
Male 0.0168 -0.0013
(0.0546) (0.0559)
Age -0.0713** -0.0776**
(0.0327) (0.0335)
College 0.1551*** 0.1500***
(0.0327) (0.0333)
2nd Term -0.0051 -0.0005
(0.0441) (0.0449)
Leftist Political Party 0.0327 0.0402
(0.0345) (0.0350)
Constant 0.3041*** 0.3532***
(0.0619) (0.1124)
Observations 881 878
Municipal Characteristics No Yes
R-Squared 0.0335 0.0416
Municipalities’ Characteristics
Population -0.0079 -0.0164
(0.0343) (0.0339)
College Population 0.0634 0.0421
(0.0466) (0.0458)
Public Adm College -0.0345 -0.0372
(0.0339) (0.0335)
Poverty -0.1015 -0.0739
(0.0903) (0.0928)
Gini 0.0449 0.0413
(0.0382) (0.0379)
Big South 0.0258 0.0597
(0.0662) (0.0661)
Per Capita Income -0.0762 -0.0642
(0.0839) (0.0855)
Local Tax Revenues (2010-2015) -0.0245 -0.0119
(0.0459) (0.0451)
Constant 0.4343*** 0.3532***
(0.0937) (0.1124)
Observations 878 878
Individual Characteristics No Yes
R-Squared 0.0084 0.0416
Notes: Linear probability results. Response variable is information session participa-
tion and takes the value of 1 for mayors that attended the information session and 0
otherwise. Mayors’ characteristics included in the model are: Male (1/0); Age above-
below median (1/0); College (1/0); 2nd Term (1/0) and Leftist Political Party (1/0,
mayors belonging to a center-leftist party according to historical political platforms).
Municipalities’ characteristics included in the model are: Population above-below me-
dian (1/0); College Population above-below median (1/0); College Public Administra-
tion employees above-below median (1/0); Poverty above-below median (1/0); Gini
above-below median (1/0); Big South (1/0, where 1 are south, southeast and mid-west
regions; and 0 are north and northeast regions); monthly Per Capita Income above-
below median (1/0); Local Tax Revenues share above-below median (1/0);. Robust
standard errors clustered at the municipality level are in parenthesis. * p < 0.1, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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TABLE A.6: POLICY-ADOPTION EXPERIMENT:
ITT POLICY ADOPTION: TAX REMINDERS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
LHS Variable Adopted Adopted Adopted Adopted Adopted
Treatment Assignment 0.0402* 0.0422** 0.0392* 0.0469 0.0412*
(0.0208) (0.0206) (0.0210) (0.0321) (0.0250)
Observations 2,271 2,269 2,054 912 1,357
Respondent All All All Mayor Finance Staff
Attention Check No No Yes No No
Mayor Characteristics No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipal Characteristics No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clusters (Municipalities) 1465 1464 1412 912 1357
Mean Control 0.317 0.317 0.298 0.367 0.283
Notes: OLS estimation results. The dependent variable is a dummy which takes the value of 1
if respondent says the policy was adopted in municipality. Treatment Assignment is a dummy
which takes the value of 1 if the mayor was assigned to the treatment group. Attention Check
refers to whether those observations that answer positively to the attention check component of
the reminders policy are excluded from the model, where the attention check was “The tax re-
minders sent informed taxpayers that the Brazilian constitution was reformed in 1988”. Mayors’
characteristics included in the model are: Male (1/0); Age above-below median (1/0); College
(1/0); 2nd Term (1/0) and Leftist Political Party (1/0, mayors belonging to a center-leftist party
according to historical political platforms). Municipalities’ characteristics included in the model
are: Population above-below median (1/0); College Population above-below median (1/0); Col-
lege Public Administration employees above-below median (1/0); Poverty above-below median
(1/0); Gini above-below median (1/0); Big South (1/0, where 1 are south, southeast and mid-west
regions; and 0 are north and northeast regions); monthly Per Capita Income above-below median
(1/0); Local Tax Revenues share above-below median (1/0);. Robust standard errors clustered at
the municipality level are in parenthesis. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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TABLE A.7: POLICY-ADOPTION EXPERIMENT:
POLICY ADOPTION: MAYORS’ HETEROGENEITIES ABOUT TAX REMINDERS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
LHS Variable Adopted Adopted Adopted Adopted Adopted
Characteristic Male Age College 2nd Term Leftist Party
Information Session -0.0544 0.1515** 0.1481 0.1084* 0.0700
(0.2007) (0.0661) (0.1051) (0.0588) (0.0691)
Information Session*Characteristic 0.1715 -0.1045 -0.0663 -0.0321 0.0913
(0.2081) (0.1076) (0.1212) (0.1373) (0.1072)
Characteristic 0.0077 0.0191 0.0081 0.0149 -0.0234
(0.0483) (0.0288) (0.0293) (0.0398) (0.0301)
Observations 2,271 2,271 2,271 2,271 2,271
Respondent All All All All All
Attention Check No No No No No
Clusters (Municipalities) 1465 1465 1465 1465 1465
Mean Control 0.317 0.317 0.317 0.317 0.317
Notes: 2SLS estimation results. The dependent variable is a dummy which takes the value of 1 if re-
spondent says the policy was adopted in municipality. Information Session is a dummy which takes
the value of 1 if the municipality’s mayor attended the information session about tax reminders. This
last variable is instrumented with treatment assignment. Attention Check refers to whether respondents
that answered positively to the attention check component of the reminders policy are excluded from
the model, where the attention check was “The tax reminders sent informed taxpayers that the Brazilian
constitution was reformed in 1988”’. Mayors’ characteristics included as interactions are: Male (1/0);
Age above-below median (1/0); College (1/0); 2nd Term (1/0) and Leftist Political Party (1/0, mayors
belonging to a center-leftist party according to historical political platforms). Robust standard errors
clustered at the municipality level are in parenthesis. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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TABLE A.8: POLICY-ADOPTION EXPERIMENT:
POLICY ADOPTION: MUNICIPALITIES’ HETEROGENEITIES ABOUT TAX REMINDERS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
LHS Variable Adopted Adopted Adopted Adopted Adopted Adopted Adopted Adopted
Characteristic Population College Pop PubAdm College Poverty Gini Big South Pc Income Local Taxes
Information Session 0.1289* 0.0836 0.1180 0.1266* 0.1709** 0.1001 0.0992 0.0705
(0.0743) (0.0749) (0.0731) (0.0740) (0.0803) (0.0877) (0.0770) (0.0754)
Information Session*Characteristic -0.0515 0.0351 -0.0320 -0.0437 -0.1155 0.0130 0.0111 0.0557
(0.1060) (0.1061) (0.1062) (0.1057) (0.1066) (0.1099) (0.1057) (0.1060)
Characteristic 0.0110 0.0434 0.0317 -0.0743*** -0.0555* 0.0855*** 0.0903*** 0.0314
(0.0287) (0.0287) (0.0288) (0.0286) (0.0288) (0.0294) (0.0286) (0.0288)
Observations 2,271 2,271 2,271 2,271 2,271 2,271 2,271 2,269
Respondent All All All All All All All All
Attention Check No No No No No No No No
Clusters (Municipalities) 1465 1465 1465 1465 1465 1465 1465 1464
Mean Control 0.317 0.317 0.317 0.317 0.317 0.317 0.317 0.317
Notes: 2SLS estimation results. The dependent variable is a dummy which takes the value of 1 if respondent says the policy was adopted in municipality.
Information Session is a dummy which takes the value of 1 if the municipality’s mayor attended the information session about tax reminders. This last variable
is instrumented with treatment assignment. Attention Check refers to whether respondents that answered positively to the attention check component of the
reminders policy are excluded from the model, where the attention check was “The tax reminders sent informed taxpayers that the Brazilian constitution was
reformed in 1988”’. Municipalities’ characteristics included in the model are: Population above-below median (1/0); College Population above-below median
(1/0); College Public Administration employees above-below median (1/0); Poverty above-below median (1/0); Gini above-below median (1/0); Big South
(1/0, where 1 are south, southeast and mid-west regions; and 0 are north and northeast regions); monthly Per Capita Income above-below median (1/0); Local
Tax Revenues share above-below median (1/0);. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level are in parenthesis. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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TABLE A.9: POLICY-ADOPTION EXPERIMENT:
POLICY ADOPTION: TAX REMINDERS INFORMATION COMPONENTS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
LHS Variable On Time Audit Social Norm Before Due Letter
Information Session 0.1019** 0.0703 0.1048*** 0.0881* 0.0853**
(0.0518) (0.0469) (0.0370) (0.0511) (0.0408)
Observations 2,269 2,269 2,269 2,269 2,269
Respondent All All All All All
Attention Check No No No No No
Mayor Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipal Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clusters (Municipalities) 1464 1464 1464 1464 1464
Mean Control 0.313 0.224 0.113 0.293 0.156
Notes: 2SLS estimation results. The dependent variable is a dummy which takes the value of 1
if respondent says the information component of the policy was adopted in municipality, and 0
otherwise. On Time refers to a reminder message highlighting the tax payment deadline. Au-
dit refers to a reminder message highlighting the risks of audits for not paying taxes on time.
Social Norm refers to a reminder message highlighting the social norm of paying taxes. Before
due refers to sending the reminder message before taxes’ due date. Letter refers to sending the
reminder message using a hard copy letter. Information Session is a dummy which takes the
value of 1 if the municipality’s mayor attended the information session about tax reminders.
This last variable is instrumented with treatment assignment. Attention Check refers to whether
respondents that answered positively to the attention check component of the reminders policy
are excluded from the model, where the attention check was “The tax reminders sent informed
taxpayers that the Brazilian constitution was reformed in 1988” Mayors’ characteristics included
in the model are: Male (1/0); Age above-below median (1/0); College (1/0); 2nd Term (1/0) and
Leftist Political Party (1/0, mayors belonging to a center-leftist party according to historical politi-
cal platforms). Municipalities’ characteristics included in the model are: Population above-below
median (1/0); College Population above-below median (1/0); College Public Administration em-
ployees above-below median (1/0); Poverty above-below median (1/0); Gini above-below me-
dian (1/0); Big South (1/0, where 1 are south, southeast and mid-west regions; and 0 are north
and northeast regions); monthly Per Capita Income above-below median (1/0); Local Tax Rev-
enues share above-below median (1/0);. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality
level are in parenthesis. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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TABLE A.10: POLICY-ADOPTION EXPERIMENT:
POLICY ADOPTION: FINANCIAL INCENTIVES AND E-PROCUREMENT
(1) (2)
LHS Variable Financial Incentives E-procurement
Information Session 0.0077 0.0254
(0.0553) (0.0643)
Observations 2,206 1,694
Respondent All All
Attention Check No No
Mayor Characteristics Yes Yes
Municipal Characteristics Yes Yes
Clusters (Municipalities) 1451 1190
Mean Control 0.602 0.449
Notes: 2SLS estimation results. The dependent variable is a dummy
which takes the value of 1 if respondent says the policy was adopted
in municipality. Information Session is a dummy which takes the value
of 1 if the municipality’s mayor attended the information session about
tax reminders. This last variable is instrumented with treatment assign-
ment. Attention Check refers to whether respondents that answered
positively to the attention check component of the reminders policy
are excluded from the model, where the attention check was “The tax
reminders sent informed taxpayers that the Brazilian constitution was
reformed in 1988”. Mayors’ characteristics included in the model are:
Male (1/0); Age above-below median (1/0); College (1/0); 2nd Term
(1/0) and Leftist Political Party (1/0, mayors belonging to a center-leftist
party according to historical political platforms). Municipalities’ char-
acteristics included in the model are: Population above-below median
(1/0); College Population above-below median (1/0); College Public
Administration employees above-below median (1/0); Poverty above-
below median (1/0); Gini above-below median (1/0); Big South (1/0,
where 1 are south, southeast and mid-west regions; and 0 are north
and northeast regions); monthly Per Capita Income above-below me-
dian (1/0); Local Tax Revenues share above-below median (1/0);. Ro-
bust standard errors clustered at the municipality level are in parenthe-
sis. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
47
TABLE A.11: POLICY-ADOPTION EXPERIMENT:
BELIEFS AND CONFIDENCE: TAX REMINDERS AND FINANCIAL INCENTIVES
Panel A (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LHS Variable | Belief-10% | | Belief-10% | | Belief-10% | | Belief-10% | | Belief-10% | | Belief-10% |
Information Session -1.6003** -1.7238* -1.5180* 0.1747 -0.7834 0.6749
(0.6271) (0.9202) (0.7959) (0.6287) (0.9431) (0.8018)
Mean Control 6.775 6.824 6.742 7.172 6.857 7.382
Panel B (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LHS Variable | Belief-12% | | Belief-12% | | Belief-12% | | Belief-12% | | Belief-12% | | Belief-12% |
Information Session -1.3648*** -1.3052* -1.4196** 0.3033 -0.3511 0.6387
(0.5170) (0.7322) (0.6816) (0.5239) (0.7727) (0.6811)
Mean Control 6.968 6.859 7.041 7.006 6.719 7.198
Panel C (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LHS Variable | Belief-20% | | Belief-20% | | Belief-20% | | Belief-20% | | Belief-20% | | Belief-20% |
Information Session -0.6139 -0.1079 -0.9931 0.7405 0.9865 0.5974
(0.6884) (0.9862) (0.9245) (0.7336) (1.0530) (0.9529)
Mean Control 9.122 8.389 9.616 7.904 7.860 7.933
Panel D (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LHS Variable Confidence Confidence Confidence Confidence Confidence Confidence
Information Session 0.0820 0.1072 0.0843 -0.0114 -0.3072* 0.1946
(0.1063) (0.1697) (0.1367) (0.1122) (0.1753) (0.1418)
Mean Control -0.0171 0.109 -0.102 -0.00291 0.126 -0.0894
Observations 2,184 859 1,325 2,154 844 1,310
Respondent All Mayor Finance Staff All Mayor Finance Staff
Policy Tax Reminders Tax Reminders Tax Reminders Financial Incentives Financial Incentives Financial Incentives
Attention Check No No No No No No
Mayor Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipal Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clusters (Municipalities) 1439 859 1325 1431 844 1310
Notes: 2SLS estimation results. In panels A, B and C, the dependent variable is the absolute difference between self-reported beliefs about effect sizes of policy on
local tax revenues, and the informed effect size of the reminder letters policy during the information session. In panel D, the dependent variable is self-reported
confidence level about beliefs in a likert-scale of 1 to 5 (standardized to mean 0 and standard deviation 1). Information Session is a dummy which takes the value
of 1 if the municipality’s mayor attended the information session about tax reminders. This last variable is instrumented with treatment assignment. Attention
Check refers to whether respondents that answered positively to the attention check component of the reminders policy are excluded from the model, where
the attention check was “The tax reminders sent informed taxpayers that the Brazilian constitution was reformed in 1988”. Mayors’ characteristics included in
the model are: Male (1/0); Age above-below median (1/0); College (1/0); 2nd Term (1/0) and Leftist Political Party (1/0, mayors belonging to a center-leftist
party according to historical political platforms). Municipalities’ characteristics included in the model are: Population above-below median (1/0); College
Population above-below median (1/0); College Public Administration employees above-below median (1/0); Poverty above-below median (1/0); Gini above-
below median (1/0); Big South (1/0, where 1 are south, southeast and mid-west regions; and 0 are north and northeast regions); monthly Per Capita Income
above-below median (1/0); Local Tax Revenues share above-below median (1/0);. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level are in parenthesis.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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FIGURE A.1: DEMAND/BELIEFS EXPERIMENT:
ECD: DESCRIPTION
Notes: Survey experiment script.
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FIGURE A.2: DEMAND/BELIEFS EXPERIMENT:
ECD: GOAL AND MEASURE
Notes: Survey experiment script.
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FIGURE A.3: DEMAND/BELIEFS EXPERIMENT:
ECD: BENCHMARKS
Notes: Survey experiment script.
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FIGURE A.4: DEMAND/BELIEFS EXPERIMENT:
PRIOR ELICITING: OWN MUNICIPALITY
Notes: Survey experiment script.
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FIGURE A.5: DEMAND/BELIEFS EXPERIMENT:
PRIOR ELICITING: OTHER CONTEXT
Notes: Survey experiment script.
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FIGURE A.6: DEMAND/BELIEFS EXPERIMENT:
BDM INSTRUCTIONS
Notes: Survey experiment script.
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FIGURE A.7: DEMAND/BELIEFS EXPERIMENT:
POSTERIOR ELICITING: OWN MUNICIPALITY
Notes: Survey experiment script.
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FIGURE A.8: POLICY-ADOPTION EXPERIMENT:
POLICY BRIEF: PAGE 1
Notes: Taxpayer reminder letters policy brief.
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FIGURE A.9: POLICY-ADOPTION EXPERIMENT:
POLICY BRIEF: PAGE 2
Notes: Taxpayer reminder letters policy brief.
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FIGURE A.10: POLICY-ADOPTION EXPERIMENT:
POLICY BRIEF: PAGE 3
Notes: Taxpayer reminder letters policy brief.
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FIGURE A.11: POLICY-ADOPTION EXPERIMENT:
POLICY BRIEF: PAGE 4
Notes: Taxpayer reminder letters policy brief.
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